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About Yemaya
Marianna Leishman
Yemaya is the African-Yoruban, Afro-Brasilian and Afro-Caribbean Goddess of the Ocean, whose waters broke and 
created a flood that created the oceans. While she can be destructive and violent, Yemaya is primarily known for her 
compassion, protection and water magic.
Often depicted in the form of a mermaid, and worshipped as a moon goddess in the Haitian Vodou, Yemaya is also 
known as Queen of Witches, the Constantly Coming Woman, the Womb of Creation and Stella Maris (Star of the 
Sea). Associated with female mysteries, fertility, childbirth and shipwreck survivors, it is said that new springs of 
water appear whenever she turns over in sleep.
In Cuba, she is referred to as Yemaya Olokun, who can only be seen in dreams, and her name is a contraction of 
Yey Omo Eja: “Mother Whose Children are the Fish”. Canonised as the Virgin Mary, and appearing as river goddess 
Emanjah in Trinidad, Yemaya rules the sea, the moon, dreams, secrets, wisdom, fresh water and the collective uncon-
scious. In Brasil, crowds gather on the beach of Bahia to celebrate Candalaria: a Candomble ceremony on December 
31. Candles are lit on the beach while votive boats made from flowers and letters are thrown into the sea for Yemaya 
to wash away their sorrows.
Lake Tekapo, New Zealand Brooke Hughes
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Editor’s Welcome
Anna Payten
Welcome to Yemaya 2009.
First published by the Sydney University Law Society in 2006, Yemaya is now in its fourth year and continues to 
provide a vehicle to illustrate and access the opinions, thoughts and creative expressions of women. This year, the 
Law Society is proud to publish a collection of essays, short stories, poetry, personal reflections, opinion pieces, 
photography and art from a diverse range of women. Our contributors hail from various backgrounds both from 
within and beyond Sydney University, extending to women across the world. 
Contributions to this year’s journal not only provide an insight into the vast array of issues facing women today, but 
identify ways in which they can be overcome. Our contributors have explored a diverse range of topics including; the 
parenting rights of women, the rights women have over their own bodies, surrogacy and marriage rights of 
homosexual couples and the impact of the global financial crisis on the adult entertainment industry.  In addition, the 
journal provides a snapshot of the role of women in the professions of veterinary science and international relations 
and explores the relevance of feminism in the field of criminology. We are also proud to feature the photography and 
artworks of several young women which beautifully capture the experiences of women around the world. 
The experience of editing Yemaya has been a thoroughly enjoyable one and I am extremely grateful for the assistance 
of those involved. This publication would not have been possible without the generous sponsorship of Mallesons 
Stephen Jaques.  I would especially like to thank Sam Garner and Emma Lloyd for their support throughout this 
project. We are honoured to have the journal launched this year by Justice Virginia Bell of the High Court of Australia. 
Thank you to the Womens’ subcommittee and all who have helped with the production of Yemaya – it has been 
wonderful to work with such an enthusiastic and dedicated group of people. Finally, thank you to our contributors for 
sharing your ideas and creativity with us.
I hope you enjoy this year’s edition.
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Our Culture
Jaisalmer, India Brooke Hughes
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“The issue of ‘equal time’ or ‘shared care’ for post-sepa-ration parenting arrangements has long been hotly contested. However, with the introduction of the ‘equal time’ provisions in the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth), the issue has come under sharp scrutiny. This essay argues that undue emphasis on time in the new legislation is likely to lead to an assumption amongst judges, practitioners and parents that the more time a child spends with each parent, the better off that child will be. The ‘equal time’ provisions take the focus away from quality of parenting by suggesting that the meaningfulness of a relationship 
can be measured in hours and minutes. The idea that it 
is generally best for children to spend equal time with 
both parents is a misguided principle which focuses 
not on the wellbeing of the child, but on the wishes of 
parents. In reality, shared care is often inappropriate and 
unworkable due to the age of the child, the presence 
of conflict, issues related to violence or simply because 
such arrangements are logistically extremely difficult and 
financially taxing. Further, the cases that come before 
the court are likely to be those in which a shared care 
arrangement is most inadvisable. 
What has changed?
Prior to the 2006 amendments, standard care arrangements 
for children post-divorce generally reflected the ’80:20 
rule’, which refers to the time children spent respectively 
with their mother and father. For most children of divorce, 
their mother’s home was their main home, while they 
saw their father every second weekend and for half the 
school holidays. Altobelli notes that this ‘default visita-
tion schedule’ was not an intended effect, but rather, 
simply reflected what families, practitioners and judges 
expected and had become accustomed to. 
The Family Court’s statistical data from 1993 to 2002 
shows that the overwhelming majority of contact          
arrangements fell within this normal or default range: 
shared care was the outcome of proceedings in only 
8% of sample consent applications, 4% of cases settled 
before trial, and % of those cases that were judicially 
determined. The Court accounted for the low figure 
in judicially determined cases by noting that ‘litigating 
parents are more likely to be hostile and un-cooperative 
with each other than are those who are able to negotiate 
a settlement involving their children. Shared residence 
is most unlikely to be in the best interests of children in 
such circumstances.’ 
The 2006 reforms promoted a major cultural change 
in relation to the way that children are parented after 
divorce.  In line with the recommendations of the Every 
Picture Tells a Story report,  the new legislation intro-
duced section 65DAA, which requires that where an 
order for shared parental responsibility has been made, 
the court ‘must consider’ making an order for the child 
to spend equal, or if not equal, then substantial and 
significant time with each parent if this would be in the 
best interests of the child and would be ‘reasonably 
practicable’.  
While this does not create a presumption in favour of 
shared care, it is designed to encourage a shift in the 
family law system away from the traditional 80:20 ap-
proach and towards a shared care model. Recent Family 
Court statistics evidence this change: in clear contrast 
to outcomes of proceedings between 1993 to 2002, 
statistics for Family Court cases conducted between 
007-008 showed that 9% of consent cases and % 
of judicially determined cases resulted in a 0:0 care 
arrangement, while a further 17% of consent cases and 
% of judicially determined cases resulted in a care ar-
rangement somewhere between 30:70 and 45:55.7  This 
very significant increase demonstrates that, consistent 
with the aims of the amended legislation, there has been 
a clear shift towards shared care.8
Requirement to advise about shared care
Under the new legislation, not only must the court con-
sider making an order for shared care, but advisers must 
inform parents that they “could consider” the option of 
an equal time arrangement.9 As Rathus points out, prac-
titioners are very influential in decision-making. The mes-
sage implicit in what lawyers, mediators or counsellors 
say to parents can be very powerful in influencing what 
a party will include in their application or affidavit, how 
they will participate in discussions about settlement, and 
also what they may agree to in an agreement or parent-
ing plan.0  In practice, this requirement will mean that 
throughout the separation process, the parties will con-
tinually have it suggested by their lawyer, family counsel-
lor, dispute resolution practitioner and family consultant, 
that they enter an equal time arrangement. As a result, 
Equal Time – In whose best interests?
Lizzie Finn analyses the legal approach to 
post-separation parenting arrangements
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parties are likely to get the impression that this is the 
model they should be aiming towards; the model that 
society and the law believes is ‘right’.  
Interestingly, there seems to be no prerequisite of as-
certaining whether equal shared parental responsibility 
is appropriate in the particular case before advisers are 
bound to suggest shared care. Section 63DA(2) simply 
states that the adviser is bound to inform the parents of 
the option of shared care in situations where the adviser 
is providing advice ‘in relation to the parental responsi-
bility for a child following the breakdown of a relation-
ship.’ Thus, it appears that the legislation requires 
advisers to give this advice even where shared care is 
clearly inappropriate, such as in cases where violence is 
an issue. 
In whose best interests?
Lamb argues that while legal decisions are often justified 
by reference to children’s best interests, in reality, deci-
sion-making and policy development are often guided by 
political, ideology and cultural values rather than sci-
entific research. He believes that in the case of divorce, 
what is fair for the parents often obscures, or takes 
precedence over what is in the children’s best interests. 
The idea of ‘equal time’ epitomises this concern: it is 
not about the best interests of the child, but rather, is a 
parent-focused concept which, Kuehl argues, is based on 
the idea that because it is usually difficult to choose be-
tween two good parents, the Court should simply use a 
procedural, mathematical formula to divide up the child.  
Kuehl argues that parenting arrangements should do 
what children request: ‘to reflect, as much has possible, 
the way their lives were arranged before the divorce, 
whatever that was. Only in this way can we truly say we 
are operating in the best interest of the child.’’  
Maloney concurs. ‘Equal time’, he argues, is a reduction-
ist approach to parenting, which ‘borders on treating 
children as commodities.’  The term ‘equal time’, which 
was inserted into the legislation almost at the last mo-
ment, distracts attention from the central issue, that is, 
that children have an ongoing relationship with both par-
ents.  Research consistently shows that when determin-
ing whether a care arrangement is in the best interests of 
the child, it is the quality of parenting which matters, not 
the amount of time the child spends with each parent.  
As Smart writes, the key element is ‘not equal time, but 
equal caring.’7  
Studies of parents with 50:50 care showed that espe-
cially for fathers, a key motivating factor behind the push 
for equal parenting was a sense of their own rights as 
parents.8  For others the proposal was a chance to make 
the system fair, just, equitable and dignified.9  What ad-
vocates of the presumption seemingly failed to take into 
account were the realities of the proposal for children.
Children caught in a warzone
A multitude of studies suggest that where there are high 
levels of conflict between parents, shared care can have 
a detrimental effect on children’s well-being.0   In fact,  
studies show that intensity of conflict is a better predic-
tor of adjustment than separation and divorce per se. 
Frequent transitions between warring parents can exac-
erbate this interparental conflict.  Gardner points out 
that where warring parties agree to ‘joint custody’, what 
may actually result is a no custody arrangement, in which 
neither parent has power or control, and the children 
are caught ‘in a no-man’s land exposed to their parents’ 
crossfire and available to both parents as weapons.’  
McIntosh and Chisholm note that when children make 
frequent transitions between warring parents who can-
not conceal their feelings in front of the child, these chil-
dren become preoccupied and ‘begin to use considerable 
energy to ensure their own comfort and emotional safety 
in each environment, actively and constantly monitoring 
the “emotional weather” they encounter in each parent’s 
home.’  This can cause acute anxiety for the child, and 
may greatly diminish their capacity for learning, think-
ing, interacting and playing.  McIntosh writes of Rachel 
(10) as an example of the stress and anxiety caused by 
constantly moving between warring parents. Seven years 
after her parents’ acrimonious divorce, Rachel arrived 
for therapy clutching a complicated visiting schedule that 
she was trying to work out for herself in an attempt to 
order her chaotic world:
“Everything is wrong”, and the tears came and didn’t 
stop, through moments of pent-up rage. “I’m not allowed 
to even take my insulin from Dad’s house to Mum’s 
house. I’m not allowed to play the CD Dad gave me at 
Mum’s house. They fight all the time about who can have 
me – either they both want me or neither of them wants 
me.”  
Further, constant transition between warring parties 
has been found to leave children confused about their 
loyalties,7  and feeling torn between their parents.8   
These feelings are most pronounced and their effects 
most destructive, where the child is caught within their 
parents’ conflict.9  Because children in shared care ar-
rangements are more regularly exposed to conflict, they 
are more likely than 
sole-residence children 
to report feeling caught 
between their parents. 
Buchanan et al. found 
that such feelings were 
related to higher levels 
of child depression, 
anxiety and deviant 
behaviour.0  
Conflict is especially 
detrimental to young 
children. Enduring parental conflicts disrupts attachment 
processes in infancy. High intensity conflict is linked with 
the development of insecure and disorganised attach-
ment styles. This in turn interrupts the development of 
emotional security. Children are more prone to negative 
emotional arousal and distress, are less able to regulate 
their feelings, less optimistic about their ability to cope, 
and less able to cope.  Further, because children under 
five are more likely to self-blame, inter-parental conflict 
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is likely to be especially detrimental for them. 
Persistent conflict between parents has been found to 
pervasively undermine the quality of their parenting, and 
their affective response to their children.  Parents can 
be so consumed with the conflict that the needs of the 
children become secondary; children may instead feel 
that they must protect their parents’ feelings. According 
to Smart, the majority of children know how important 
apportionment of time is to their parents, and do not 
wish to upset an arrangement which is ‘fair’ to their 
parents.  
Neale, Flowerdew and Smart found that some children 
in shared care who found the arrangement burdensome 
were reluctant to raise the issue with their parents for 
fear of reigniting parental conflict or because they felt 
‘too guilty or too responsible for their parents feelings 
to broach the subject.’  Matt (15) for instance, told the 
interviewer that he would prefer to stay in one place, but 
did not want to tell his parents because, “They’d prob-
ably go mental about the amount of time I was spend-
ing at each 
house…I’d just 
feel under 
pressure not 
to say any-
thing…They’d 
fight over 
every day...
they’d argue 
over like, 
whoever had 
one long day 
or something.”  If children in shared care arrangements 
wish to change their living arrangements, but cannot 
express this wish for fear of upsetting their parents, then 
an equal care arrangement is probably not in their best 
interests.7 
 In fact, where this is the case Smart, Neale and Wade 
argue that shared care ‘can be just as debilitating...as 
those cases where one parent refuses to allow children 
to see the other parent or to spend meaningful time with 
them.’8  As Batagol writes, for children in such pressured 
situations, a law which engrains the expectation of equal 
time ‘creates an additional prevailing societal expectation 
of being a son or daughter by carefully measured equal-
ity.’9  
Even when parents do recognise that the arrangement is 
not working, where conflict is high, most parents will be 
unwilling to upset the delicate balance of the agreement, 
‘to willingly throw the situation back into conflict.’0  
Thus, arrangements may remain which are not effective 
or not best for the child, simply because the alternative 
is a return to court.
Shared care for young children
In deciding whether a shared care arrangement is ap-
propriate, the age and developmental stage of the child 
are important considerations. Although there is general 
recognition that inappropriate living arrangements can  
have a serious impact on young children’s psychological 
development, there is disagreement about what care ar-
rangements are most appropriate for young children. 
McIntosh and Chisholm argue that there are important 
developmental reasons why a shared care arrangement 
may be unsuitable for young children. Children’s healthy 
emotional development is dependent on the existence 
of a continuous care-giving relationship from an early 
age, through which they can form an organised attach-
ment.  In order to form good attachments, a child must 
have a continuous experience of reliable care with one 
or other parent: attachment security does not transfer 
from parent to parent as a child moves between them. 
Rather, the child is likely to have a more secure attach-
ment to one parent (usually the mother) than the other.  
Constant movement between parents, as happens in 
shared care arrangements, disrupts and is likely to have a 
negative impact on the primary attachment relationship, 
which in turn can have serious developmental conse-
quences for the child.  
However, some child psychologists question the assertion 
that shared care is necessarily detrimental for young chil-
dren. Advocates of shared care for young children argue 
that much child development literature fails to recognise 
the importance of fathers, and that attachment theory is 
often overstated and misinterpreted.  Kelly and Lamb 
for instance, reject the argument that a child forms only 
one primary attachment. While they note that young 
children do develop a preferential relationship with their 
primary caregiver, they argue that ‘amounts of time that 
infants spend with their two parents do not affect the 
security of either relationship.’  They argue that by the 
age of 2, children can manage two consecutive over-
nights with each parent without stress, and suggest that 
care arrangements for infants and toddlers should in-
volve frequent transitions between households to avoid 
long separations from either parent.  
However, Solomon and Biringen question the findings, 
methodology and recommendations made by Lamb 
and Kelly. While agreeing that theories of attachment 
have often been misunderstood and misused to exclude 
fathers from the lives of young children, they point out 
that overnight separations present a far greater chal-
lenge to the development of organised primary attach-
ments than do daytime separations. In addition, they 
note, there is no evidence to suggest that frequent 
overnight transitions have a positive effect on the father-
infant attachment. Thus it seems frequency of contact is 
often an explicit need of the parent, rather than of the 
child. 
Significantly, despite the divergent views of researchers 
concerning appropriate care arrangements for young 
children, all agree that shared care is inadvisable in cases 
where high levels of parental conflict are coupled with 
low levels of parental communication.7  Even Lamb and 
Kelly note that young children require a stability and con-
sistency, so that while the two residential environments 
need not be the same, feeding and sleeping routines 
must be similar.8  This requires a high level of coopera-
tion and communication between parents – unlikely 
7
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where parents are highly conflicted. 
Successful shared care requires specific conditions
In reality, shared care arrangements are unlikely to be 
suitable in most cases which come before the Family 
Court. Studies suggest that successful shared care is 
generally associated with a distinct demographic profile. 
Moyer found that shared residence arrangements were 
more common among better educated, higher earning 
parents who cooperate and are child-oriented, and in 
families that include boys and only children.9  Smyth et 
al. found that families who self-selected into shared care 
tended to display a number of common characteristics; 
they concluded that successful shared care requires the 
confluence of a number of conditions: geographical prox-
imity; a business-like relationship; child-focused arrange-
ments; commitment by all to make shared care work; 
family-friendly work practices, especially for fathers; a 
degree of financial independence, especially for moth-
ers; and a degree of paternal competence.0   
Shared care requires an extremely high level of coopera-
tion. Take for example, what may be seen as the typical 
shared care situation: the week-about arrangement. 
Under such an arrangement, any extracurricular before 
or after school activity which a child wishes to takes part 
in must be negotiated with the other party. A parent can-
not enrol their child in Tuesday afternoon soccer practice 
or Thursday morning piano lessons without consulting, 
coordinating, and agreeing with the other parent. 
As well as a high degree of cooperation, shared care ar-
rangements also require a number of favourable mate-
rial conditions. Financial capacity is central, since shared 
care is resource intensive, often requiring duplication of 
central infrastructure like clothes, computers, sporting 
equipment, furniture and toys across the two homes.   
Unfortunately, most families are be unable to meet these 
conditions, which is probably why self-selected shared 
care is relatively rare amongst the general population. 
For many families, equal care will be unworkable and 
unachievable.  
Imposing shared care: an order to agree
The above section outlines the conditions necessary for 
a shared care arrangement to be successful. Unfortu-
nately, as McIntosh and Chisholm point out, separating 
parents who require litigation or formal mediation to 
determine their care arrangements tend not to exhibit 
these characteristics.   For this reason, the imposition 
of shared care arrangements by the court is often inap-
propriate.  
Imposing shared care arrangements on parents is un-
likely to enable them to achieve the conditions neces-
sary to sustain a successful shared care arrangement.  
In fact, numerous studies show that where shared 
care arrangements are court-imposed, they are gener-
ally unsuccessful. An early study by Steinman et al. 
of families with court-imposed joint custody arrange-
ments found that in all but one of the families, the 
court-imposed joint-custody arrangement had failed. 
They concluded that the more the court influences 
the joint custody arrangement, the more negative the 
8
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“
outcome. 
Johnston et al. found that the children in their study 
who were placed in shared care arrangements at the 
behest of a court or mediator were significantly more 
depressed, more withdrawn and uncommunicative, 
had more somatic symptoms, and tended to be more 
aggressive.7  A recent study (the ‘Child Responsive 
Program’ study) looking at the outcomes for parents 
and children prior to and four months after litigated 
settlement of their care disputes, found that in 73% of 
cases in which shared care had been ordered, at least 
one parent reported “almost never” cooperating with 
the other parent four months later, and in 39% of these 
cases, at least one parent reported “never” being able 
to protect their children from the conflict.8  
Shared care arrangements agreed to in formal media-
tion seem to be similarly unsuccessful. The findings of 
the ‘Children Beyond Dispute’ research program con-
sidered separated parents who were involved in media-
tion for entrenched parenting disputes. A year after the 
dispute was resolved, they found that 75% of parents 
who had completed mediation with a new agreement 
for shared care had reverted to a less than 35:65 divi-
sion. In contrast, all the parents who had arrived at the 
mediation in already established shared care arrange-
ments maintained that arrangement over the course of 
the year.9 
That shared care arrangements arrived at through 
mediation or court orders are often unsuccessful is not 
surprising. As Kuehl notes, ‘Simply ordering parents 
to cooperate in the raising of their children has never 
worked to guarantee or increase such cooperation.’0  
Many of the studies which reported positive outcomes 
for shared care involved self-selected arrangements or 
did not control for self-selection.   Parents who fit the 
criteria necessary for a successful shared care arrange-
ment are likely to be able to agree themselves to a 
shared care arrangement without the need for media-
tion or litigation: the qualities which the research sug-
gests will result in successful shared care arrangements 
are similar to those which permit parents to agree to 
their own post-separation children’s arrangements in 
the first place.  
Where the conflict and disagreement between parties 
is such that a detailed parenting order is necessary, 
shared care is unlikely to be in the best interests of the 
children. As Hetherington et al. point out, ‘those liti-
gated cases in which a judge is forced to make a difficult 
custody decision may be exactly the ones for whom 
joint custody will not work.’   
It is therefore concerning that both the Child Respon-
sive Program study which looked at litigated cases and 
the Children Beyond Dispute study which considered 
mediated cases, found higher rates of shared care 
among parents who had been involved in legal conflict, 
than in the general population of separating parents 
(46% litigation sample; 27% mediation sample; 9.5% 
general population).   While shared care should be 
available to parents who elect it, it should not be im- 
posed on unwilling parents.
Conclusion
It is submitted that while shared care arrangements can 
work for some families, for a majority of families, they 
are not appropriate or workable. While the new legis-
lation maintains that the child’s best interests are the 
paramount consideration, the emphasis on time may 
cloud this overriding principle and overshadow other 
important considerations, to the detriment of outcomes 
for children. The new emphasis on time can mislead par-
ents and judges from a focus on the quality of parenting 
and the child’s welfare, towards a focus on equal time for 
parents.
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“My name is Rachael. I am in recovery from anorexia and major depression. It is still difficult for me to say that aloud. Four years ago, at fifteen, I had lost my health, my hair, my skin, my self-esteem, my energy, my height, my ambition, my friends, my ability to think, to reason, my trust in myself, other’s trust in me, my pride; in short, my identity, to a disease I had rarely considered, even in the vaguest terms.  Four years on, I have painstakingly struggled to grasp it all back. It is, and, I suspect, always will be, a work in progress. I am not the same person I was pre-anorexia, and nor will I ever be. However, my present self is so far removed from the dangerously sick girl I was in high school that recall-ing and articulating my state of mind at that time is incredibly challenging. The brief flashes of recollec-tion I do have in certain places, or at certain times of 
year, are still incredibly intense. I recently opened a 
bottle of perfume I have not used for a few years, and 
was quite literally bombarded by a stream of nega-
tive emotions and images, to the extent that I found 
myself shaking, on the verge of tears, and experienc-
ing severe stomach pains within a few seconds.  That 
said, I know that these experiences never come close 
to reaching the constant anxiety and terror of an 
anorexic mind. I also know that they are transient and 
I cannot stress enough how happy, how relieved that 
makes me. 
At my lowest physical point, I weighed below 35 kilos. 
For a girl of average height, this was fatally under-
weight. I was hospitalised for seven weeks, and have 
no doubt that physically, this saved my life. My memory 
of this point and the months leading up to it is very 
fractured. My brain is literally physically incapable of 
giving any narrative, coherent framework to this period 
of constant crying, incessant biting cold, desolation, 
intense loneliness and isolation, bruising, shaking, in-
somnia, physical pain, terror, panic and confusion. 
It is commonly cited that anorexia has the highest sui-
cide rate of any psychological illness. I have been told 
by countless medical practitioners that the mortality 
rate of the disease is around 0% and that, of the select 
few that do fully recover, an average ‘recovery period’ 
is around 7 years. Those numbers are scary. I have cried 
myself breathless over them countless times. To suf-
fer from anorexia is to have your own self mercilessly 
screaming at you every second of every day. For years. 
I remember literally not understanding how it would 
be possible to sit and feel the way I did for minutes, 
let alone hours, days or years without dying from the 
inside out, actually disintegrating with sadness. For what 
seemed like an indescribably long period of time, every 
time I found myself crying I honestly believed I would 
never be able to stop. 
I cannot emphasise enough the devastating nature of the 
disease not only physically but emotionally and mentally. 
To watch your body self-destruct is scary. To experience 
the same phenomenon in your mind is terrifying.
Hopefully, these feelings are beyond your personal 
identification. I can only imagine how hard it is to watch 
someone close to you become dangerously, seemingly 
irrevocably consumed by irrationality, obsession and 
depression. I do not know what I weighed before this. I 
could not tell you what clothing size I was. I wore what 
fitted. It was simply never an issue. To explain the blatant 
paradox behind this phenomenon, I emphasise that it 
simply was never about my weight.
Anorexia is a psychological enigma, and I do not profess to 
have any more of the hows and whys than the rest of the 
community. What I do have is a memory of the devastat-
ing, prolonged struggle back to life. I do not use these 
terms theatrically. Recovering from anorexia was invari-
ably harder than slowly submitting to self-destruction. 
Once I realised something was seriously wrong, I cannot 
emphasise enough how firmly convinced I was that I could 
not do ‘it’. It was inconceivable to imagine a world where 
obsession with food, weight, and self-loathing did not 
permeate every thought I had. I remember being over-
whelmed with panic when realising that I could not recall 
a time when this did not define my reality.
My stubbornness, my pride, my perfectionism, and my 
impossibly high expectations fuelled my anorexia. They 
are also what eventually got me out. Recovering from 
anorexia was like climbing out of a well. You will seem 
completely isolated. You will often have no idea how to 
proceed. The struggle will overwhelm you, so that you 
will not be able to contemplate or interact with anything 
else. It will be torturous, and to simply let go and fall will 
often seem inevitable, and always seem easier. Some-
times, you will simply have to stay where you are for a 
while. But as long as you don’t let go, this is not failure. 
To get out will take what seems like an eternity, and you 
won’t see the top until you get there.
Physical recovery was painstaking. But I write this not to 
theatricalise an ugly, confronting disease, rather in an 
attempt to bring some sense of understanding to onlook-
ers, and perhaps sufferers, about how overwhelmingly 
incomprehensible the nature of the disease is to every-
The Road to Recovery
Rachael Hyde shares the story of her battle 
with anorexia and her gradual healing journey
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“one involved. I am still ashamed to say I laughed off a 
friend’s real concerns about me dying on more than one 
occasion. Unfortunately, I quite literally could not com-
prehend what well-meaning friends at their wit’s end 
were saying when they would shout, reason, threaten, 
cry and plead with me in a vain attempt to push me away 
from self-destruction. My lack of response at the time 
meant that they still, I think, are not aware of the large 
part they played in saving my life, not physically, but 
mentally. 
As an individual, a parent, a sibling, a friend, or a com-
munity, we cannot provide alleviation for the mental 
agony that is recovery. As much as we would like to, we 
cannot pull our loved ones out, or crawl up for them. 
What we can do is be waiting at the top of the well. 
What we must do is to believe in them when they cannot 
believe in themselves. For however long it takes.
No-one is equipped to deal with this disease. We have 
come a long way in the recognition of mental illness, but 
from my experience, overcoming the stereotypes and 
the embarrassment that persist long after physical recov-
ery was a large part of the struggle. Anorexia nervosa is 
not a self-serving disease of vanity. It is not a stereotyped 
perfectionist desire for control, nor a middle-class cry for 
attention. It is not a conscious decision. It has no good 
points. To truly, genuinely believe that eating to maintain 
yourself is somehow promiscuous on your part is a reac-
tion to a great deal more than models in magazines. 
I have only recently recognised that recovery also 
involves dealing with grief. This is not an inappropriate 
word to describe the long-term trauma inflicted by the 
disease. I still lament that I was, at best, only half-pres-
ent at many points in my life. Further, as much as hos-
pitalisation was physically helpful, the experience was 
emotionally destroying. 
To be forcibly placed with a group of girls as physically 
and mentally ill as I was introduced me to an intense 
amount of competition , mind games and despair. 
Perpetual snide remarks, threats or open hostility from 
other patients and, most notably, nurses either inflict-
ing blame for anorexics ‘wanting to be sick’ or trivialis-
ing our difficulties on top of my own crumbling state of 
mind resulted in daily anxiety attacks, chronic insomnia 
and constant, constant crying that continued far beyond 
my discharge.
For the next few years, when the memories and the 
continuing struggle with recovery still dominated and 
interfered with a large part of my daily life, every time 
someone even vaguely referenced eating disorders, or 
hospital, or food, or weight, whether generically or per-
sonally, be they naïve or informed, I would experience a 
hot surge of shame and fear.  At first, it was overwhelm-
ing. But with each year I become more recovered, more 
distanced from the disease, more sure of my post-an-
orexic self, I become more capable of recognising, articu-
lating, and dealing with the trauma and it’s implications.
I took a gap year last year before starting university, and, 
for the first time, told some of the people I met over-
seas about my history with anorexia and depression 
out of my own free will. I remember being incredibly 
surprised that this did not alter my relationship with 
them in any way, did not change their perception of 
me, or our ability to enjoy each other’s company. It still 
somewhat surprises me that I was, and am, pleased, 
not regretful, that I told them. Love and support are the 
best tools you can offer to a sufferer. You do not need 
to know what to say, or how to ‘fix’ someone. You do 
need to recognise both their need for support and their 
independence. You do need to recognise anorexia as a 
disease, not a personality. 
Now, I get hungry, rather than faint, a few times a day. 
Having lunch with a friend is enjoyable, rather than 
stressful. I don’t obsessively plan or analyse the food I 
eat. I am free to think about other, far more engaging 
topics in my day, and in my dreams. Mirrors are predict-
able, and somewhat useful, rather than terrifying. All 
this is amazing. But more than that, I can trust again. I 
am not proud, but nor am I desperately ashamed, of my 
experience with anorexia. My perception of myself is 
not defined or limited by memory of the disease. I have 
many amazing people around me that I care about, and 
genuinely have a lot of fun with, but who also, I am still 
realising, accept and support my history and my con-
tinuing chal-
lenges and 
will be there 
for me if I 
ever need or 
ask them to 
be. 
Until recent-
ly, I never 
believed 
that anyone understood the psychological trauma I 
experienced. It is only through learning about anorexia 
and depression that I have realised that as much as it 
feels like your well is deeper and darker than anyone 
else’s, other people have gone through the same thing, 
and have come out the other side.
It is a blessing that those that haven’t cannot perhaps 
entirely identify with your struggle. That does not 
mean that they cannot be incredibly important in your 
recovery, or that having had anorexia must somehow 
damage your relationship with them. Ironically, whilst 
one of the defining features of anorexia was, for me, 
an overwhelming sense of isolation, 2-3% of Australian 
females fulfil diagnostic criteria for the disease.
My name is Rachael. I am in recovery from anorexia and 
major depression. I am also a highly motivated, ambi-
tious law student with a love of ricotta cheesecake, 
walking in the rain, warm doonas, peppermint tea, 
musty old books and polka dots. I do not know exactly 
why anorexia or depression develop, or progress so 
devastatingly. I do not know exactly what we can do as 
individuals, or as a society, to prevent the illnesses, or 
hasten recovery. I do know that it is possible to come 
out the other side, to regain an identity for oneself, and 
to re-engage with the world. And it’s wonderful.
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“To suffer from anorexia 
is to have your own self 
mercilessly screaming at 
you every second of   
every day.”
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Kore; or I 
Persephone
Alice Zheng explores the mythology of the 
Goddess of the Underworld 
 
(I) Ripe 
 
Helios’ steeds’ 
sweeping wings 
lathe your brow 
 
and scoop over rye-tickled 
bellies, swelling  
with late summer air 
  
and startling  
through the earth –   
sheathed blossoms, tips 
lancing the breathless sky. 
 
 
Quick-fingered, you trawl the fields sown with your 
footprints 
ransacking cowslips to wreath in your hair 
Wide acres, 
stretching like lines on Zeus’ palm 
traverse toward Dusk 
where, against 
the chalk white caves  
springs a lone, proud narcissus  
  black. 
Between two          heartbeats 
          steals  
          a  
      sudden  
      quiet; 
 
                     dimming  
the fury of a red sun.  
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like an eel, 
sliding beneath your feet in shallow waters 
 
silvery slimy shock. 
 
 
But:  
you squelch through wet foreboding,  
defiant; to pluck –  
 
 
– bright darts of petal glint – clean nails 
             sharply pinch – jet 
 
in your hand; 
sinking like the sun – 
 
The ground grinds its jaw,  
vice-like lips stretch, mouthing the tumult 
of its giant face splitting 
a chariot springing from between rocky gums 
like a tongue 
chasing the plucked narcissus –  
fluid flanks and dark manes 
rope behind the grumbling of the earth. 
Boulders catapult and shatter 
and Hades emerges, shadowed by stony wrath 
in the volcanic pelter of hoofs, rears his arm  
and scoops… 
 
seized by your dress. 
he clutches you to his side, his steeds stampeding at 
the dying light. 
 
 
Swallowing – 
your face pressed to his armoured breast,  
 
his eyes spear the horizon 
pinning the world beneath him –  
 
you tear your mouth wide and 
 
a shriek –   
like the sharp shafts of narcissi 
     scratching at the sky – 
  
  Mother! 
 
 
as tunnelling bones and dirt 
stir and converge – the topography of death – 
under the chariot wheels 
  grinding over your hoarded blooms 
  falling from your hands; a dowry 
wilted. 
 
 
 
 
 
(II) Rind 
  
 
Stop crying 
or I’ll slap you.   
Hecate’s whittled fingers 
cork your tears. 
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Swallowing – 
your face pressed to his armoured breast,  
 
his eyes spear the horizon 
pinning the world beneath him –  
 
you tear your mouth wide and 
 
a shriek –   
like the sharp shafts of narcissi 
     scratching at the sky – 
  
  Mother! 
 
 
as tunnelling bones and dirt 
stir and converge – the topography of death – 
under the chariot wheels 
  grinding over your hoarded blooms 
  falling from your hands; a dowry 
wilted. 
 
 
 
 
 
(II) Rind 
  
 
Stop crying 
or I’ll slap you.   
Hecate’s whittled fingers 
cork your tears. 
 
 
Seizing the hem, 
she flings you out of  
your clothes 
 
tossing your chiton to her dogs. 
 
Did the horses shit on you? 
she sneers 
at your stink. 
Mewling and helpless, 
  your spine shrivels 
  like a salted slug 
 
  an insoluble lump 
  wedged in your throat 
 
folds of clean linen 
erasing your limbs. 
 
  Pinching your scalp, 
Hecate rips dead flowers from your hair 
and discards them.  
You are a gnat 
  squashed under her sandal. 
 
–  
The halls of the dead 
are hollow 
his court of echoes and shades dispersed. 
  
You think of your mother’s fields 
the warm baked earth  
shot with cowslips and billowing reeds  
 
 
With your ebony locks still  
dripping of the Styx, 
  
dread crab-claws your intestines 
and pride wrings your tear-ducts dry 
as Hades approaches. 
 
Paralysed. 
 
  Kore, is it? 
 
Your lead weighted tongue 
clunks in your mouth. 
 
He’s grey tinted and carved 
from the marble of his columns, 
the silk of his tunic 
hemmed with onyx. 
 
His granite eyes roll, 
with a fluttering of black spiny lashes. 
Speak. 
Are you frightened?  
I will be kind. 
 
Speak. 
His voice bruises you. 
 
You sink your heels, 
quiver like a shredded sail  
 
Let me go home to my mother. 
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With your ebony locks still  
dripping of the Styx, 
  
dread crab-claws your intestines 
and pride wrings your tear-ducts dry 
as Hades approaches. 
 
Paralysed. 
 
  Kore, is it? 
 
Your lead weighted tongue 
clunks in your mouth. 
 
He’s grey tinted and carved 
from the marble of his columns, 
the silk of his tunic 
hemmed with onyx. 
 
His granite eyes roll, 
with a fluttering of black spiny lashes. 
Speak. 
Are you frightened?  
I will be kind. 
 
Speak. 
His voice bruises you. 
 
You sink your heels, 
quiver like a shredded sail  
 
Let me go home to my mother. 
 
 
– 
 
Bitten by the draughty air 
You are excavated  
  empty as a grave 
  waiting for a cadaver 
  to rot within. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(III) Flesh 
 
 
Weeks slouch by 
thick-thighed and pregnant 
miscarried grief kicking 
damp, shivering 
  petals. 
 
 I’m scared 
 
 let me go 
 I’ll be good; quiet; gone.  
 
Limpid loneliness plugs up 
hysteria’s abyss 
 and Hecate pinches you 
into your flesh. 
 
 I won’t cry.  
 
– 
 
Bitten by the draughty air 
You are excavated  
  empty as a grave 
  waiting for a cadaver 
  to rot within. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(III) Flesh 
 
 
Weeks slouch by 
thick-thighed and pregnant 
miscarried grief kicking 
damp, shivering 
  petals. 
 
 I’m scared 
 
 let me go 
 I’ll be good; quiet; gone.  
 
Limpid loneliness plugs up 
hysteria’s abyss 
 and Hecate pinches you 
into your flesh. 
 
 I won’t cry.  
 
 
– 
 
 You hollow;  
your mother’s memory sliding down newly starved planes 
    clinking about your ankles. 
–  
 
a ringing bell 
igniting the air, 
 flint fingered 
 drying Hades’ moist breath  
 a shadow, pressed and brittle, 
against your lids 
– 
 
Your father Zeus, enthroned in air, 
     through his thunder and might he does 
not hear, though his ears they reach, your cries. 
 
Then cry no more your worthless tears.  
  
 and Demeter, 
    nail-broken hands scrabbling dirt graves to 
dig you out from Death, 
though Death grows aeons deep.  
 
And beg no more, and no more should you weep.  
 
 and your own hands, 
   milky-blossomed and vain, blistering at the 
touch of sand. 
 
–   
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Hades’ crown 
discord spun and hewn 
pulses a dim sun 
moulding the mineral depths 
as Zeus steers the heavens. 
 
 
It hangs: 
 the signet of his Queen; 
her ebony bones pillar the roof 
and she wades through the dead  
like reeds, 
armoured in his skin. 
– 
 
and you, 
in your bare skin, 
shivering. 
 
– 
 
Weeks slouch by 
halted by your decision  
  to enter the House of Hades. 
 
Rising from seclusion and 
draped heavy in shoaly grey 
 
you spear fathoms; 
 
waxing like the moon,  
cupping light in  
your clear-veined hands.    
 
 
– 
 
 You hollow;  
your mother’s memory sliding down newly starved planes 
    clinking about your ankles. 
–  
 
a ringing bell 
igniting the air, 
 flint fingered 
 drying Hades’ moist breath  
 a shadow, pressed and brittle, 
against your lids 
– 
 
Your father Zeus, enthroned in air, 
     through his thunder and might he does 
not hear, though his ears they reach, your cries. 
 
Then cry no more your worthless tears.  
  
 and Demeter, 
    nail-broken hands scrabbling dirt graves to 
dig you out from Death, 
though Death grows aeons deep.  
 
And beg no more, and no more should you weep.  
 
 and your own hands, 
   milky-blossomed and vain, blistering at the 
touch of sand. 
 
–   
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The Last Hour: Model Adele Thiel (Chadwicks); Makeup Artist Miss Ruby 
Rouge; Hair Stylist Lyndall Vile (Head Over Heels); Styling Adele
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I am a girl who likes to illustrate my imagination through 
photography. I love to beautify, capture personalities, 
evoke emotion, bring meaning to life. I love conversa-
tions that provoke thought. I am also a bit of a drama 
queen at times, I think that influences the theatrical 
quality of my work.
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My Story, My Words
Melanie Nasser shares her experience of 
overcoming adversity 
20
business owner.  So, I secured a bank loan and started my 
own business. At the age of 23, I was the proud owner of 
a chocolate store, and it wasn’t long until I branched out 
into three new stores, commenced franchise operations, 
employed a staff of 12, and purchased a brand new car. 
Yet, amid all this, I often wondered what could have 
become of me had my family remained intact and had 
I completed school. I eventually sold my business and 
enrolled at TAFE for the Tertiary Preparation Certificate 
(TPC), the equivalent of Year 12. I successfully completed 
my studies, and it was during this time that my life took 
another dramatic change; I met a fellow student in the 
library, who would eventually become my husband. 
Soon after our marriage, my husband and I opened a 
business in the health food sector, and did well for some 
time. Unfortunately, following an unfortunate series of 
events, we lost our business, our home and most of our 
belongings and my husband and I were forced to live in 
our car. Throughout this time it was extremely difficult to 
find employment. 
To my amusement my husband suggested we return to 
studies to improve our chances of employment. This is 
exactly what we did, and while living in a car, I returned 
to TAFE, completing my Diploma in Business, Human 
Resources with Distinction, taking 1st place in the course.
It was during this time that I developed a deeper passion 
for education and with encouragement and support from 
my husband, decided to pursue my academic studies. I 
applied through UAC for admission into a Combined Law 
degree, and to my delight I received an offer from not 
one but two institutions. It is with great joy I am now a 
full-time law student at the University of Sydney. 
My time at university to date has been, and still is, 
remarkable in many ways. My thoughts often return 
to my days at TAFE, where my teachers were not only 
supportive of my studies and unlike my school coun-
sellor who said I would be a ‘nobody,’ treated me as 
though I was ‘somebody’ with a positive contribution 
to make in this world. 
Throughout my life so far, I have learnt that there is 
great power in simply believing you can achieve all 
you set your sights upon, and throughout the fierc-
est trials which may fall upon you, faith, hope and 
courage are vital. My story so far ends here, but my 
journey and adventures continue, as I look forward 
with great anticipation to where my studies at univer-
sity will eventually take me and the people I will meet 
along the way. 
This is my story, and in my own words.
Life is a wonderful journey and behind each countenance 
there is a story to tell. This is my story, and in my words. 
I remember arriving with my family in Australia at the 
age of 7, and everything went well for a few short years. 
Then, tragedy struck. I was 9 years old when my mother 
was diagnosed with cancer. As the eldest daughter of the 
family, I could no longer attend school, but remained at 
home nursing my Mother. I recall the days when I helped 
her to perform the simplest tasks, such as walking to the 
bathroom, taking a shower, holding a spoon for a bowl of 
soup and even drinking out of a cup, all of which became 
a daily challenge for her. Eventually, after a 3 year battle 
with cancer, she passed away. My life would never be the 
same again.
My Dad re-married a number of times, none of which 
worked out. My once united family was now torn and 
divided in many ways, and I found myself questioning 
everything about life, death and religion. Looking back, 
I was an inquisitive child, persistent in finding answers 
to my questions. By the time I was 15, my Dad had had 
enough of my religious questions. Having proclaimed my 
newfound Christianity, I was disowned and cast out from 
the family. My Dad told me to leave the house, and said I 
was a disgrace to the family. 
The memories of that horrid day are as vivid to me today 
as though they had just taken place. I remember walk-
ing away from my home, leaving behind my sister, and 
the memories of my Mother. With each step I took, I 
left a trail of tears. I walked for hours with nowhere and 
no-one to turn to. My school friends were no longer 
permitted to speak to me, and my school counsellor 
had advised against associating with me, as I would be a 
‘nobody.’ Painful words indeed for a homeless teenager 
with no education, no school or high school certificate, 
no friends, and as it appeared, nothing left to live for. 
But, within weeks I secured employment as a supermar-
ket cashier and maintained contact with my sister. Each 
day my eyes were fixed upon the entrance of the su-
permarket door, hoping and longing for the day my Dad 
would come for me, and take me back home. That day 
was not to be, and my Dad never came for me. 
It took some time, but I eventually realised that I do 
have great worth and am capable of accomplishing many 
things, just like anyone else. I learned a lot during that 
time and swiftly matured beyond my years. I understood 
the importance of not waiting for opportunity to knock 
at my door, but to go out and seek opportunity, and 
to make the most of all that came my way. Eventually I 
came to the conclusion that, since I wasn’t given op-
portunities to advance in employment due to my lack 
of academic qualifications, I would work for myself as a 
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Life is a wonderful journey and behind each countenance 
there is a story to tell. This is my story and in my words. 
I remember arriving with my family in Australia at the 
age of 7, and everything went well for a few short years. 
Then, tragedy struck. I was 9 years old when my mother 
was diagnosed with cancer. As the eldest daughter of the 
family, I could no longer attend school, but remained at 
home nursing my Mother. I recall the days when I helped 
her to perform the simplest tasks, such as walking to the 
bathroom, taking a shower, holding a spoon for a bowl of 
soup and even drinking out of a cup, all of which became a 
daily challenge for her. Eventually, after a 3 year battle with 
cancer, she passed away. My life would never be the same 
again.
My Dad re-married a number of times, none of which 
worked out. My once united family was now torn and 
divided in many ways, and I found myself questioning 
everything about life, death and religion. Looking back, I 
was an inquisitive child, persistent in finding answers to my 
questions. By the time I was 15, my Dad had had enough 
of my religious questions. Having proclaimed my newfound 
Christianity, I was disowned and cast out from the fam-
ily. My Dad told me to leave the house, and said I was a 
disgrace to the family. 
The memories of that horrid day are as vivid to me today 
as though they had just taken place. I remember walking 
away from my home, leaving behind my sister, and the 
memories of my Mother. With each step I took, I left a trail 
of tears. I walked for hours with nowhere and no-one to 
turn to. My school friends were no longer permitted to 
speak to me, and my school counsellor had advised against 
associating with me, as I would be a ‘nobody.’ Painful 
words indeed for a homeless teenager with no education, 
no school or high school certificate, no friends, and as it 
appeared, nothing left to live for. 
But, within weeks I secured employment as a supermarket 
cashier and maintained contact with my sister. Each day 
my eyes were fixed upon the entrance of the supermarket 
door, hoping and longing for the day my Dad would come 
for me, and take me back home. That day was not to be, 
and my Dad never came for me. 
It took some time, but I eventually realised that I do have 
great worth and am capable of accomplishing many things, 
just like anyone else. I learned a lot during that time and 
swiftly matured beyond my years. I understood the impor-
tance of not waiting for opportunity to knock at my door, 
but to go out and seek opportunity, and to make the most 
of all that came my way. Eventually I came to the conclu-
sion that, since I wasn’t given opportunities to advance in 
employment due to my lack of academic qualifications,         
I would work for myself as a business owner.  So, I secured 
a bank loan and started my own business. At the age of 23, 
I was the proud owner of a chocolate store, and it wasn’t 
long until I branched out into three new stores, com-
menced franchise operations, employed a staff of 12, and 
purchased a brand new car. 
Yet, amid all this, I often wondered what could have be-
come of me had my family remained intact and had I com-
Our World
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““[U]nless the question of gender remains at the forefront of criminological endeavours…criminology will fail to offer an agenda that is suitably informed by an under-standing of social justice that strives to be attentive to humane constructions of…offenders, whether or not they be male or female.”  The public outcry in response to female offenders is evidence of the continuing role that needs to be played by feminists in criminology. The early study of the aetiol-ogy and character of female crime by feminists exposed axiomatically that the foundations of criminology were profoundly based on the masculine perspective. Much mainstream criminological thinking was ‘skewed’ be-cause the essential maleness of criminological subjects was ignored.  Thus feminist criminologists have made some inroads into “penetrating”  the “enormous blind spot”  that is ungendered criminology. Yet the relevance 
of contemporary feminist criminology has been queried. 
Theorists such as Smart and Klein argue that in order to 
effect real change in societal and legal perceptions of 
the female offender, feminism must avoid criminology’s 
“allegiance to positivist paradigms”.  This essay argues 
that despite calls to reject criminology as the source of 
effectual change, it is clear from contemporary media 
discourse of female criminals such as young offenders, 
that we still need feminist criminology; ‘we’ being soci-
ety. The feminist criminology that this essay advocates is 
perhaps better described as the ‘feminist perspective on 
criminology’ because the term ‘feminist criminology’ im-
plies a discourse still marred by positivist attitudes. The 
feminist perspective offers the opportunity to reveal and 
communicate women’s experiences and views in order 
to transform the content of the law and the prevailing 
societal concepts of justice.  
The media is an interesting barometer of the gap be-
tween “popular fictions” of criminal women and “un-
popular [feminist] truths”7  because by selecting and 
presenting ‘problematic events’ it influences societal 
consensus on criminal deviation and criminal discourse.8  
This essay will examine whether feminist epistemologies 
can address the failings of traditional criminological theo-
ries by engaging in research that recognises the critical 
significance of sex and gender differentiation on female 
criminal behaviour. 
Feminists and Light Bulb Jokes*
Has feminist criminology ‘made it’? If not, 
do we still need it? Antonia Clarke  
examines the relevance of a feminist  
approach to criminology
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A brief overview of the failings of traditional crimino-
logical theories 
“She was driven by her hormones or her heart, never by 
reason” – Sumner (1990)
The feminist point of view was largely absent from 
criminological epistemology during the early periods 
of theoretical development. This latent development 
inhibited the understanding of the female criminal as 
an autonomous subject, and instead placed the female 
criminal as the ‘other’ in criminal studies of men.9 The 
reason behind this historical lack of interest in female 
offending was that being male “is so frequently associ-
ated with criminal behaviour”0  – female offenders 
were, and still are, statistically insignificant in terms of 
general crime rates. Moreover, the ignorance of women 
as criminals was reflective of the concern of traditional 
‘control-oriented’ criminology with recidivist criminals;  
female offenders were mostly engaged in petty offences 
and therefore did not pose a “pressing social problem.”  
Prior to the women’s liberation movement, the study of 
females in criminology was underdeveloped. 
The stunted development of criminology in respect of 
women meant that traditional ideologies merely pro-
vided a “scientific gloss”  for culturally given under-
standings of women and their role in crime. The biologi-
cal reductionist theories propounded by Lombroso and 
Pollak are the clearest examples of the ‘scientific’ theo-
ries constructed from the cultural notion of a woman’s 
place in patriarchal society. These theorists explained 
female crime by referring to the concept of the ‘proper’ 
female role; women that deviated from the norm were 
“revengeful, jealous, inclined to vengeances of refined 
cruelty” resulting in the opinion that the criminal woman 
was a “monster”.  Moreover, female offenders were 
viewed as “far more sinister and cruel than men”  
because of their deviation from the socially constructed 
norm. 
The socialisation theories that followed early reductionist 
views also characterised the behaviour of women crimi-
nals in terms of predetermined social constructs. These 
theories hypothesised that women who engaged in 
crime were a result of ‘poor socialisation;’ that is, these 
women were not socialised to be “passive and need 
affection.”7  Role theory went further and propounded 
that as crime is “symbolically masculine,” women are 
unsuitable for crime and therefore the feminine woman 
will choose not to engage in the essentially male activity 
of law breaking.8  Becker argued that such labeling of 
women as passive and domestic meant that they were 
more likely to be conformist and less likely to commit 
crime.9  
As early feminist criminology informs us, these theo-
ries were based on little more than culturally accepted 
stereotypes about the nature of women and crime. The 
theories perpetuated sexist ideologies not only because 
they differentiated between the sexes, but because 
socially undesirable traits were explained with reference 
to the intrinsic nature of women.0  Whilst the flaws in 
these theories have meant that they are largely repudi-
ated today,  their effects clearly resonate in contempo-
rary media discourse on female offenders. The problem 
with these theories is that they can be oversimplified and 
utilised by society to explain female offender behaviour 
in a manner that accords with their preconceptions of 
women.  
The media essentially uses these explanations to create 
simple, “self-evident and unchallengable”  storylines 
that perpetuate cultural notions about women and 
crime. Khalilizadeh views the 1950s New Zealand murder 
trial of the teenage girls Parker and Hulme as illustrative 
of the way in which early criminological theories concep-
tualised female criminals within patriarchal constructs. 
She argues that during this pre-feminist era the ‘known’ 
woman in “the patriarchal space [was] obedient, docile, 
mild-mannered and sexually submissive;”  both Parker 
and Hulme stepped outside this space and consequently 
were objectified and “mythologised” by the media.  
Early feminist criminologists attempted to expose this 
myth. 
Whilst it is 
generally agreed 
that feminist 
perspectives in 
criminology have 
exposed the 
myth of early 
criminological 
explanations 
of the female 
offender, this es-
say argues that 
the myth still haunts popular modes of thought. Rather 
than evincing the need to reject the feminist perspective 
in criminology, however, the perpetuation of this myth 
highlights the continuing need for a feminist perspective 
that can transcend cultural preconceptions. This essay 
looks at the role already played by feminism in criminol-
ogy to identify how it has failed to impact popular modes 
of thought, and how it can rectify this failure to assume 
greater cultural relevance.
The role of feminism in criminology
“And all the time she was there behind me, staring. She 
just stares. She is, you know, a witch. I could feel her eyes 
burning holes in my back” – Joy Kuhl as quoted in Evil 
Angels (1985)
Feminism as a political, sociological and philosophical 
theory has many facets and differing degrees of radi-
calism and liberalism. There is no one relationship 
between feminist perspectives and criminology but it 
is generally agreed that feminist contributions aim to 
place women’s criminal behaviour into a broader social, 
economic and political context in a way which illumi-
nates the institutionalised sexism of the criminal justice 
system. As a whole, feminist criminologies acknowl-
edge that women have for too long been peripheral to 
the study of men.7  Thus criminology is fundamentally 
flawed because men are defined as the standard scien-
tific case, resulting in empirically biased research.8   
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heightened when young 
girls engage in criminal 
behaviour because crime 
has traditionally been 
viewed as a masculine 
activity.”
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Early feminist criminologists identified that male criminal 
behaviour was explained by a plethora of factors, includ-
ing socioeconomic background, upbringing and early 
response to deviant behaviour. Gender had no role to 
play in these explanations, even in the face of extraor-
dinary evidence that shows crime is committed largely 
by males. In contrast, traditional criminological theories 
(and the law) sought to contain and control the female 
offender by classifying, defining and so domesticating her 
behaviour.9  Any deviation from the expected gender role 
was inextricably linked to her sex, her biological being.0  
By confining the explanations of female criminal behav-
iour to the “mad/bad dichotomy”  at an individual level, 
society was blinded to the possibility of seeing the other 
causes of female criminal behaviour.  The early intrusion 
of feminism into criminology attempted to address this 
gender bias, not through evaluating the essential ‘male-
ness’ of crime, but through discussion of ‘women and 
crime’. 
Since those early beginnings, feminist perspectives on 
criminological theories have become more comprehen-
sive.  This essay will limit its analysis to the fundamental 
tenets of feminist empiricism. It will examine how it has 
been used to understand and address the representa-
tions of the female criminal in contemporary media using 
the case studies of juvenile female offenders. The public 
outcry to these offenders demonstrates that so far, the 
feminist intrusion into criminology, and thereby society, 
has not been effective. Yet it also represents the continu-
ing need for the development of a feminist perspective in 
criminology which plays a role in criminal justice reform 
and consequently alters social consciousness through criti-
cism and demystification of accepted values and beliefs. 
Feminist empiricism
Feminist empiricism arose from the acknowledgment that 
whilst men had been studied in an objectively scientific 
way and were the “centre of the [criminological] pic-
ture,”  women were largely absent from the sphere of 
scientific observation. Feminist scholars aimed to identify 
the inherent sexism in criminal institutions by document-
ing women as both offenders and victims. Yet the call for 
more studies on women was largely politically motivated 
and thus early studies of feminist empiricists were largely 
“‘at the service of’ feminist politics and campaigns;”  the 
research that emerged was for women, as opposed to on 
them.7  Feminist empiricism tended to accept men as the 
norm and ask why women were not treated the same. 
In this way, women did not become the subject of crimi-
nology but were the “interlopers” to the “natural social 
actor,” men.8  Fundamentally, this ‘add women and stir’ 
approach has been criticised as representing a mere social 
adjustment, rather than a conceptual paradigm shift.9 
Despite the criticisms of feminist empiricism, the basic 
recognition that women should be studied empirically is 
utilised in most contemporary feminist criminologist litera-
ture.0  Today it is particularly useful in respect of crimi-
nological analysis of young female offenders. Gelsthorpe 
and Carrington have used the intellectual context provided 
by feminist empiricism to assess the legal and societal 
responses to female juvenile offenders. 
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Girls and violence: ‘sisters in crime’
Public outrage is heightened when young girls engage in 
criminal behaviour because crime has traditionally been 
viewed as a masculine activity. Recently the media has 
become aware of some evidence which suggests that the 
number of girls engaged in criminal behaviour is increas-
ing.  Whether this statistical and anecdotal evidence 
reflects a change in the perception of girls within the jus-
tice system or a real change in female criminal behaviour 
is unclear.  Yet what is evident is that the public per-
ceive the increased violence of young females as “mainly 
due to Women’s Liberation.”  Feminist empiricists 
denote this explanation as the ‘sisters in crime’ thesis. 
The ‘sisters in crime’ thesis argues that the narrowing 
of the ratio of female to male juvenile offenders arose 
when girls begin to exercise the freedom of choice grant-
ed by the second wave of feminism.  This argument, 
also called the liberalisation thesis, has been criticised 
by feminist criminologists as methodologically unsound. 
Steffensmeier suggests that the increase in crime could 
be attributed to increases in the number of women liv-
ing in poverty and an increasing dependency on drugs; 
similar factors which affect male crime rates.  Campbell 
also acknowledges that young women often exhibit tra-
ditional views about gender roles.7  
Smart has challenged the statistical validity of the theory 
as it does not account for the contribution of unemploy-
ment, unskilled and low paid work and greater financial 
pressures in an increasingly material society.8  Moreover, 
Carrington argues that the findings are a statistical arti-
fact of the shift from girls being dealt with by the welfare 
system to the criminal justice system.9  Thus whilst femi-
nist criminologists cannot point to a singular causal basis 
for increased participation in youth subculture by girls, 
they have acknowledged that it is unlikely to arise from 
Women’s liberation. Moreover, they have unequivocally 
demonstrated that violent girls are subject to increased 
adverse attention from the criminal justice system and 
the general public. 
The shock value of violent girls is paradoxically jux-
taposed with the claim that their behaviour is (ap-
parently) the result of liberation;0  if girls are equal 
to boys why is their behaviour treated differently? 
The media is partly to blame for fueling an increased 
level of public anxiety based on empirical findings 
of increased levels of violence amongst girls. Indeed 
Worrall argues that the 1990s saw the emergence of 
several moral panics in relation to young female of-
fenders.  
In Australia, the reaction of the public and the media 
to the fatal ‘bashing’ of Sydney taxi driver, Youbert 
Hormozi, in 2006 illustrates this moral panic. The two 
fourteen year old girls involved in the unprovoked as-
sault on Hormozi were subject to a media onslaught, 
which described them as remorseless, arrogant, “vio-
lent little animals”.  Despite all contrary evidence by 
feminist criminologists, the media reported that this 
is what happens when adolescent girls are allowed 
to believe themselves equal to men.  Feminism has  
handed girls a life as “equaling stressing” as men’s 
and girls respond by becoming more deviant.
If we assume, as the media does, that Women’s lib-
eration provides the basis for female delinquent be-
haviour, then the logical response to this behaviour 
is to punish girls in the same way as boys. But the 
fact is that girls are not punished equally because of 
preconceived societal notions of femininity. Studies 
by Terry (1970) and Chesney-Lind (1973) in the UK 
and US respectively demonstrate that the courts op-
erate with a “double standard of morality” when it 
comes to female juvenile offenders.  The findings 
of these feminist empiricists illustrate that courts 
tend to sexualise the nature of female delinquency 
due to an “overwhelming concern for the sexual 
morality of young women.”  
The media perpetuates this concern through its 
construction of public perception based on biased 
statistical information. The feminist empiricist con-
tention that women’s behaviour is not a by-product 
of Women’s liberation has fallen on deaf ears. In 
effect, feminist perspectives have failed in the most 
part to deconstruct the patriarchal construct of the 
domesticated, demure female and explain female 
delinquent behaviour in the same objective terms 
as male delinquent behaviour. Yet as long as there is 
such moral outrage consistently voiced over young 
female criminals, a feminist perspective in criminol-
ogy is necessary because it offers an alternative to 
the ‘masculine hegemonic’ discourse propagated by 
the media. 
Does criminology still need feminism?
             “Unsex me here;
And fill me, from the crown to the toe, top full
Of direst cruelty!”  (Macbeth, Act I, sc. v, 38-40)
The need for feminist criminology must necessarily 
be weighed against its potential for effective legal and 
social reform. As it stands, it cannot be disputed that 
feminist criminology has brought a gendered analy-
sis into the sphere of criminological jurisprudence.7  
Criminology as a discipline has slowly become more 
sensitive to diversity of experience.8  The increas-
ing diversity can be seen tangibly in the reform of 
prostitution and rape laws and changes in policing of 
domestic violence that resulted from feminist crimi-
nological research during the 1980s and 1990s.9  But 
fundamentally this essay has shown that outside of 
law reform, feminist perspectives on criminology ap-
pear to have failed to permeate society’s preconceived 
notions of femininity with regard to explaining the 
behaviour of female offenders.
It is clear from the examination of the media’s re-
sponse to female deviants that the traditional theories 
of criminology still pervade cultural consciousness and 
provide society with instant explanations of female 
criminality.0  Media representations are still domi-
nated by popular patriarchal constructs of the female 
deviant because traditional, male-dominated theories  
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continue to exist in “common conceptual currency.”  
Indeed young girls engaged in crime are seen as a by-
product of Women’s liberation, despite feminist criminol-
ogist’s empirically-based protestations to the contrary. 
The conventional views of society in turn legitimise the 
conceptualisations of policy makers and thus preserve 
the given moral and socio-political order.  Indeed in 
the UK it has been shown that gender specific reform of 
the criminal justice system is described as “limited and 
patchy”  with regard to the female offender.
 
If, as critics of feminist criminology claim, the jurispru-
dence of feminist criminology is only ‘grudgingly’ accept-
ed by society then do we still need it as a discipline?  
The epistemological failings of criminology have led Carol 
Smart to reject the notion of feminist criminology as 
an oxymoron.  Criminology as a discipline, she argues, 
suffers from “intellectual bankruptcy.”  Its commitment 
to positivist paradigms and its inherent conservatism 
cannot be reconciled with the radicalism and diversity 
of feminist scholarship; criminology’s search for a single 
unifying solution to the multi-faceted problem of crime 
inherently limits the efficacy of feminist teachings.7  
Indeed when feminism is incorporated into criminology 
it becomes one-dimensional and is “limited by the very 
paradigm it seeks to judge”.8  
Feminist criminology, in an attempt to bring gender with-
in the patriarchal confines of a traditionally ungendered 
discipline, simultaneously ignores the pleas of different 
classes, races and sexualities of women.9  Thus Smart 
states that a new theoretical account should be devel-
oped that stands alone from the traditional positivist 
criminology claiming that “criminology needs feminism 
more than the converse.”70  
Yet one cannot escape the observation that criminology 
is, at a basic level, an exercise in sociology. We do not 
live in an “androgynous utopia”7  and as long as myths 
surrounding female crime exist, feminist criminology 
calls for an examination of the social, cultural and histori-
cal context in which those myths of female criminality 
arise.7  Whilst it is clear that the ‘add women and stir’ 
approaches have not resulted in the sought-after para-
digm shift in societal views of female offenders,7  femi-
nism still has a vital role to play. This essay argues that 
Smart’s aphorism be reassigned to state that criminology 
needs feminism because society still needs feminism. 
Feminist jurisprudence offers an approach to criminol-
ogy which queries the traditional discourses of victim, 
offender and justice. It moves beyond the paradigm of 
individual pathology and engages in an analysis of dam-
aging circumstances and power relations.7  
Its advantage lies in its ability to bring a multi-faceted 
and inter-disciplinary approach to criminology.7  In this 
way, feminist criminology evaluates society and ques-
tions the controls on female behaviour which attempt to 
fit female offenders within the normative criminological 
discourses of femininity.7  By challenging the founda-
tions of criminology, the values of feminist criminology 
can begin to form the basis of “common-sense attitudes” 
towards crime by entering folklore and by dissemination 
of feminist perspectives through the mass media.77  
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Some argue that feminist criminology can no longer 
challenge the status quo because it has become part of 
mainstream criminology.78  This essay argues, however, 
that the failure of feminist perspectives to infiltrate the 
cultural mainstream means that they still stand outside 
the accepted discourse of criminology. If feminism is to 
continue to challenge the criminological and societal 
status quo, it needs to go beyond a simple gendered 
analysis of crime and the criminal justice system. In order 
to “turn positivism on its head,”79  feminist criminology 
needs to be more inclusionary and humanistic;80  it needs 
to explore issues of control, diversity and power by re-
evaluating those ‘axiomatic’ truths that feminism seeks 
to assert.8 
The future for feminist criminology: 
revitalising critiques
“How do our insights prevent us from being captured by 
traditional justice thinking?” – Laster (1996)
If the supposition is that society needs feminist criminology 
the next issue must necessarily be how feminist criminology 
can engage with its diversity and dynamism. Carlen advo-
cates more theorisation and empirical studies on women, 
men and crime.8  Feminist criminological jurisprudence 
has responded to this call for revitalisation with the devel-
opment of theories, including ‘critical race’ feminism and 
postmodern feminism. The critical race feminists use an 
empirical approach to account for statistical differences in 
crimes committed by women of different races and classes. 
To the critical race feminist, social relations are interactive, 
eliminating colour-blind or gender-neutral approaches to 
understanding crime.8  
In contrast, postmodern feminism takes a more theoretical 
approach by deconstructing societal notions of Truth and 
the power it assumes. In doing so, it queries the “falsely 
universalising perspective of the master,”8  whether that 
master be male or female.8  Both theories overlap in their 
desire to expand the parameters of Woman as the crimino-
logical subject but approach this task in different ways. Thus 
it is clear from these theories then that feminist perspec-
tives still have much to contribute to the wider discipline of 
criminology through movements which query the precon-
ceived concepts of absolute truth and unity.8 
Postmodern feminism
Postmodern feminism (whether labeled ‘postmodern’, 
‘poststructuralist’ or ‘deconstructionist) does not offer 
itself as an alternative to the other feminist theories.87  
Instead, it rejects the notion that there can be a single 
explanation of criminality. It does this by opposing essen-
tialism – the idea that the differences between women 
and men are innate – and claims that gender is a byprod-
uct of social construction. It offers a valuable alterna-
tive to feminist empiricism, which viewed women as a 
denigrated ‘other’ to the male ‘self’, and celebrates the 
diversity and plurality that being the ‘other’ offers. 
A postmodern feminist approach works from the Fou-
cauldian notion that Truth is a social construct.88  From 
this vantage point, postmodern feminism can look 
beyond the subject of the Law (Woman) to “reimagine” 
the Law itself as the subject of its critique.89  By reassert-
ing what is objectivity it rejects the imposition of a fictive 
unitary reality on women.90  A postmodern feminist 
approach therefore allows criminological theories to in-
corporate issues of race, gender and class.9  Essentially, 
postmodern feminism offers a provocative critique of 
criminology by advocating that modernist feminist crimi-
nology ‘relinquish’ its own “gender myopia”.9 
The contribution of postmodern feminism to societal and 
legal responses to female offenders can be seen in the 
case of ‘battered women killers’. Howe identifies the con-
siderable efforts of feminist deconstructionists to reduce 
the difficulty women have in using self-defence laws 
constituted around men’s actions.9  The work recog-
nises the multiplicity of circumstances where women kill 
their male partners and invalidates the assumption that 
emotions can be universally categorised.9  The results 
of this work can already be seen in the gradual recogni-
tion by society that women subject to continual domestic 
violence are not cold-blooded killers, nor inspired by 
irrationality, but are responding to often extraordinary 
violence. 
For example, the recent case of Joyce Chant, who was 
convicted of the manslaughter of her abusive husband, 
demonstrates the understanding that the circumstances 
of violence are altered by individual experience; in the 
case of Chant, she suffered violent “bashings…nearly 
every day.”9 In this sense, postmodern feminism is an 
advocate of “emancipatory practical reason” and by 
unmasking gender prejudices encourages a description 
of relations between subjects (here, Law and the bat-
tered woman) so that the reasons behind the actions of 
offenders are recognised.9  
Yet postmodern feminist criminology is not without its 
criticisms. Carrington and Hogg highlight the problems 
with the purely theoretical nature of the study, stating 
that it merely provides “pessimistic polemics” without 
politicised change.97  Smart also queries the efficacy 
of a discourse that is “theoretically pure.”98  Indeed if 
the notion of Truth is deconstructed as a relative social 
construct, the search for what is just becomes “difficult 
to defend.”99  
Essentially, once the ‘truth’ of oppression is lost, the 
wave of collective feminist action loses sight of its goals 
and its momentum.00  In rebuttal, postmodern feminists 
such as Cornell argue that justice in fact adheres in the 
process of change and not necessarily in a universal 
preconception of the universality of justice.0  Moreover, 
a postmodern feminist approach to criminology does not 
herald the dissolution of collective action, but rather the 
emergence of a new action structured around different 
axes of oppression including race, ethnicity, or sexual-
ity.0 
Regardless of the criticisms of these developments in 
feminist approaches to criminology, what is clear is that 
these approaches reflect the reflexive awareness of the 
contribution of gender scholarship to criminology. Whilst 
feminist criminology has come closest to documenting 
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“the multi-dimensional nature of the woman’s relation-
ship with the social world it recognises that its success 
within the criminological enterprise is not “generalis-
able.”0 
 The ability to self-criticise demonstrates the fullness of 
the field of feminist criminology. The new feminism must 
seek value to distance itself from the notion that female 
criminality is explained predominantly by gender role 
expectations and engage in analytical skepticism to see 
what more can be done to influence societal preconcep-
tions of control, gender and justice.
The Way Forward
Feminism as a sociological discipline is no longer a “fly-
by-night” radical movement – it has been absorbed into 
the cultural mainstream.0  On the other hand, whilst 
feminist criminology has raised the profile of gender in 
crime, it arguably remains somewhat marginalised.0  As 
this essay contends, it is clear that gender scholarship is 
needed to protect and develop the insights made in rela-
tion to gender and crime. 
The advantage of the feminist perspective is that it can 
incorporate a variety of theoretical and empirical is-
sues within the conventional criminological concepts of 
law and justice. Most fundamentally, it highlights the 
limitations of a universal theory of criminology. In turn, 
it offers criminology the opportunity to identify and 
address its shortcomings. If “failure is the leitmotif of 
criminological enterprise”0  then the successful contri-
bution of feminist perspectives may be better measured 
by the fear it generates, rather than its acceptance by the 
mainstream.07  
Yet as it stands feminist criminology has failed in its bid to 
influence mainstream perceptions and representations 
of the female offender as shown by the public reaction to 
young female offenders. Rather than evincing the need to 
reject feminist criminology, however, this failure evinces 
the continuing need for more developments in the study 
of feminist criminology; in particular, it now needs to 
come to terms with the associations of race, sexuality and 
class to transcend the traditional constraints of society.08  
This essay explored the particular relevance of a postmod-
ern feminist approach to criminology but what is clear is 
that current developments on the feminist perspective 
must continue to shake the foundations of criminol-
ogy. Indeed the attraction of feminist criminology is that 
whilst providing criticism, it can also provide the basis for 
reform.09  
In this way, feminism becomes a fundamental tenet of 
criminology – it aids in the creation of a ‘new site’ – a 
domain where issues of gender, class and control become 
relevant to societal notions of crime. The result is a crimi-
nology that understands the cultural and societal con-
structions of female criminals. The media can therefore 
contextualise female crime so that its occurrence is not 
seen as ‘extraordinary’ and society can deal with criminal 
behaviour unobstructed by the stereotype of Woman.0
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“ tinued to maintain a robust level of adult tourism despite the economic downturn. At first glance, the legalisation of prostitution in the Netherlands may seem to draw significant atten-tion for its freak-show novelty value within the international arena. But we cannot just assume that this unique legal situation is a product of a more morally permissive Scandinavian culture.  Social researcher, Harry Oosterhuis, evinces that the Dutch are neither prudish nor hedonistic, hovering around the same area of the moral spectrum as the pop-
ulations of most Western countries. Despite the incep-
tion of these progressive laws in 2000, the Netherlands’ 
fascination with sex has hardly diminished, although it 
has undeniably legitimised the sale and purchase of sex. 
Raunchy Rationality and the  
Sexual Trade-Off 
Cat Tayeh considers the effect of the  
economic crisis on the adult entertainment  
industry in the Netherlands
The Global Financial Crisis may be a cooler doomsday 
forecast than Global Warming, but luckily it hasn’t creat-
ed any crisis in the bedroom. As recently as last Decem-
ber, the BBC identified sex as the most popular penny-
wise past time of adult British citizens. The fact that 
more and more people are relying on sex as the meat 
substitute in their recession sandwich has only con-
tributed to its overall intrigue. Though it may be more 
ephemeral than most consumer durables, the practice 
of sex and the gratification of sex have begun to perme-
ate our purchasing patterns far more overtly since the 
credit crunch. Sex is now more than a mere perk of the 
private sphere, or even a symbol of free love liberation. 
It has become a consumable good, with some interest-
ing ramifications for the social relations underlying our 
economic and legal systems. 
The unwavering gusto of the adult entertainment indus-
try at the quakes of consumer doubt is no where more 
evident than in the Netherlands.  Renowned as one of 
the most liberal cities in the world, Amsterdam has con-
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In this way, legal prostitution has crucially rewritten the 
relationships between money, sex and power. 
Whose sex is it anyway? 
The legalisation of limited forms of exploitation within 
the Dutch sex industry was justified as necessary to clean 
up the business of prostitution and reduce the level of 
associated crime. But regardless of whether the licens-
ing regulations were successful in that respect, they 
essentially codified the business relationships associated 
with sex work. Though Dutch policy documents identify 
many different types of prostitution, window sex workers 
are the most pertinent to this discussion because their 
vending practices mirror the conventional way consumer 
goods are advertised. 
Whilst most sex workers in Amsterdam see themselves as 
self-employed, in actual practice, the dictation of hours, 
house rules and payment rates by business owners have 
been interpreted by the Dutch courts as evidence of an 
employer-employee relationship. However window sex 
workers occupy a distinctly unique position within the in-
dustry because they independently rent their rooms and 
the windows that effectively serve as their advertising 
spaces. Furthermore, their hours of work and the prices 
of the services they offer are also self-determined, which 
means that they have more autonomy than most women 
who work in the industry. As in any other business, self-
employment renders them free from exploitation by 
superiors and 
gives them 
decisive own-
ership over 
the product 
they are sell-
ing.  
But sex is an 
exceptional 
product. 
Though 
those in the 
industry may 
declare that 
the physical 
nature of the 
act can be separated from its personal qualities, severing 
the identity of the vendor and the product itself is surely 
much harder to accomplish.  In this way, the legally 
recognised right to sell sex out of windows  blurs the 
distinction between supplying a service and transforming 
the individual into a consumer good. 
As such, what appears as a homogenous product or 
service at face value becomes distinctly heterogeneous 
because each product is as individual as its provider. 
Additionally, the inescapable  intimacy of all sexual acts 
means that the characterisation of the sexual transaction 
is dependent as much on the sexual desires and fantasies 
of the buyer as the provider. This makes for low levels of 
substitutability and varying levels of satisfaction between 
sex workers, reflected in the fact that many customers 
feel a sense of loyalty to a single sex worker, ironically 
perhaps, in view of the adulterous potential of such 
consumption. 
Theorising the buyers’ frenzy
The peculiarity of selling sex naturally lends itself to con-
siderations of the eccentricities associated with its pur-
chase. At first, walking through the streets of Amsterdam 
peering through the glass at women wearing nothing but 
lace and a few goose-bumps may feel like shopping for 
a new backpack. But an environment which encourages 
groups of men to hover around the glow of the red lit 
window panes provokes significant social questions. 
Window-shopping for sex embodies an emotional co-
nundrum, because the prospective buyer is simultane-
ously detached from the act of sex itself, whilst emo-
tionally invested in wanting to consume it. Shopping 
is an activity which operates in the public space. By its 
very nature it necessitates the appraisal of goods, the 
consideration of opportunity costs and ultimately the 
exchange of money. This process reinforces the objecti-
fication of window models; as they exhibit themselves 
for judgement, consumers make choices between those 
that are available and must eventually overcome their 
capitalist fetishism of money to obtain greater utility 
through the purchase. 
On the other hand, the metaphysical understanding of 
consumption proposes that we shop so that we might ex-
perience wants and desires. Accordingly, it is not far from 
exaggeration to declare that consuming everything from 
cookies to Kookai is an emotional investment, though to 
varying degrees. The personal and physical nature of sex 
and its ability to generate pleasure can only be persua-
sive evidence of its emotionally charged consumption. 
Thus, shopping for sex requires us to navigate with both 
objectivity and closeness, leaving the consumer with 
nothing but the hope that these philosophical complexi-
ties don’t impede their performance.
A second issue emerges from the power struggle as-
sociated with the gratification of the customer’s sexual 
wants. In heterosexual transactions this imbibes gender 
conflict and becomes drenched in a labour for control. 
As previously established, the unique characterisation of 
window prostitution in both law and economics allows 
these particular sex workers, more than any other kind, 
to claim ownership over their bodies and their bound-
aries. She determines what she will do and how much 
it will cost. Though these decisions are influenced by 
market demand and supply levels, and even the price 
of competitors, they also doubtlessly dictate her self- 
worth. 
Therein lies the problem, as the purchaser also claims 
ownership over elements of the sexual transaction. He 
claims that he is entitled to dictate his sexual fantasy and 
he is correct to an extent, though the final transaction will 
be subject to her consent. But even after they settle on a 
range of activities and their prices, the purchaser inevita-
bly conflates his ownership of the sexual experience with 
ownership of the sex worker herself. Even though she has 
explicit legal rights and has defined her business in terms 
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of standard commercial practices, he is still socially condi-
tioned to possess her. Hence, in this act of shopping for sex, 
the element of gratification disguises patriarchal possession 
and female subjugation. 
The last curious issue to arise from the consumption of sex 
concerns its paradoxically inconspicuous yet public na-
ture. Consumption today is not only motivated by a desire 
to maximise utility, but out of a self-conscious craving to 
belong. So rather than shop as individuals, we remodel our 
wants so that they are similar, and can therefore be gratified 
by overtly following uniform purchasing practices. However, 
the sex that we consume never goes on display so there is 
consequently no onus to moderate our desires. Instead, it is 
one of the few acts that allows for complete self-fulfilment. 
It legitimises the ordinary perversions of ordinary people, 
reconditioning us to be at ease with our own desires. 
But only Mr Moneybags needs to pay for sex!
Wondering how the consequences of shopping for sex 
affects those of us who can get it for free? Though it may 
seem that there is no money involved when couples decide 
to forgo dinner and a movie for vegemite toast and sex, we 
can still judge the value of sex in terms of the opportunity 
costs of the goods foregone. 
The economic crisis means that we are becoming increas-
ingly likely to choose sex in view of other more costly 
alternatives. Though this sex may seem like it’s for free, in 
actuality, it is dictated by the same economic rationality 
that attaches itself to shopping for sex. This is because it 
involves inescapable considerations of cost in the realisation 
of sexual desire, even though no money directly changes 
hands. The worried consumer has transformed sex; if 
only he had paid for a back massage instead. 
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Faces of Tircuhuli
Lucy Boyle
Tircuhuli is a typical village in Southern India. There is 
sporadic electricity, no running water and three streets 
made from dirt that is either so dry it flies in your eyes or 
so muddy it engulfs your feet. The residents are pre-
dominantly farmers – dependant on the whims of the 
weather for their income. In 2008, I spent one month in 
the village, working for a field-based NGO that aims to 
empower women within the local community and  
surrounding villages.  These are a selection of images of 
the women and girls I worked with whilst volunteering at 
the NGO.
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“Love, Lesbianism and the Law  Nicole Mansergh examines the same-sex marriage debateMarriage  is  an  esteemed  institution,  and  the  decision  whether  and  whom  to  marry  is  among  life’s  momen-tous  acts  of  self-definition…The  gay  marriage  ban   works  a  deep  and  scarring  hardship  on  a  very  real  segment  of  the  community  for  no  rational  reason…the  marriage  restriction  is  rooted  in  prejudice.  Having  long  been  construed  as  a  thoroughly  inequi-table   institution,  marriage  is   increasingly  a  site  of  contestation,  rather  than  consensus.  As  Hull observes,  
fierce  battles  are  being  waged  over  who  is  allowed  
to  marry,  what  marriage  signifies  and  whether  mar-
riage  should  be  extended  beyond  its  current    pa-
rameters.   Most  significantly,  the  right  to  marry  
is  increasingly  being  sought  by  disgruntled  lesbian  
couples  who  maintain  that  all  citizens,  irrespective  
of  sexual  orientation,  should  possess  the  opportunity  
to  fully  express  their  humanity  and  enact  the  rights  
and  responsibilities  of  their  citizenship.  As  Madame  
Justice  L’ Heureux-Dube  explains,   
We  must  ensure  equality  for  all…This  means  that  
our  society  cannot tolerate  legislative  distinctions  that  
treat  certain  people  as  second-class  citizens, that  de-
mean  them,  that  treat  them  as  less  than  capable  for 
no  good  reason, or  that  otherwise  offend  fundamen-
tal  human  dignity.       
Nevertheless,  in  
00  the  Marriage 
Act  1961  (Cth)  
was  amended  to  
restrict  legal  mar-
riage  to  hetero-
sexual  couples.  In 
effect,  legislators  
framed  lesbian  
unions  as  unde-
serving  of  recog-
nition  and  equal  
protection  under  
the  law.   This  
paper  will  examine 
the  validity  of  ar-
guments  that  oppose same-sex  marriage and in doing 
so will illuminate the unjustness of  Australian  law. It will 
be shown that whereever the current legislative provi-
sions prevail   there  can  be  no  equality  for  lesbian  
women  in  Australia  until  the unequivocal introduction  
of  same-sex  marriage.                     
Marital  Objections
As  West explains,   social  conservatives  generally  assert 
that  lesbian  couples  should  be  precluded  from  mar-
riage  on  the  following  grounds: 
1)  Marriage  consists  of  the  conjoining  of  man  and  
woman  in  marital  reproductive  sexual  acts,  its  over-
riding  purpose is to  ensure  the  procreation  and  rear-
ing  of  children.
2)  The  institution  of  marriage  should  protect  chil-
dren,  the  hetero-nuclear  family  being essential  to  the  
achievement  of  this  end.
3)  Lesbian  relationships  are  both  dysfunctional  and  
deviant  and,  as  such,  deserve  neither  valorisation  nor 
protection          
Marriage for reproduction?
Inherent in the first objection to lesbian marriage is the 
presumption that  lesbians  should  be  excluded  from  
marriage  by  virtue  of  their  inability  to  participate  in  
reproductive  sexual  acts.     Such  a  proposition  is  not  
a  logical  ground  on  which  to  prohibit  same-sex  mar-
riage.  Eskridge  observes that  consummation  of  a  mar-
riage  in  acts  of  sexual  intercourse  of  any  sort  is  not  
necessary  for  a  civil  marriage.7  Moreover,  if  there  is  
a  sexual  relationship  between  married  partners,  there 
is  no  requirement  that  those  relations  be  of  a  repro-
ductive  nature.    Neither  the  use  of  birth  control  nor  
engagement  in  non-coital  acts  render  a  marriage  null  
and  void. Nor  does  the  decision  to  refrain  from  hav-
ing  children  altogether.  
As  noted  by  Justice  Marshall,   a  marriage  between  
two octogenarian  partners  on  their  deathbed  is  as  
valid  as  a  marriage  between  a  couple  in  the  throes  
of  sexual  passion.8  Put  simply,  marriage  serves  com-
panionate,  economic  and  interpersonal  goals  that  
are  independent  of  procreation,  rendering  it  entirely  
appropriate  for  lesbian  couples.     
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The interests of the Child?
The  second  objection  to  same-sex  marriage  is   
equally illogical.  That  is,  conservatives  claim  that  the 
institution  of  marriage  must  serve  to  promote  and  
protect  the  well-being  of  children.9   Further,  het-
erosexual  unions  alone,  it  is  argued,  are  facilitative  
of  that  end.  The  hetero-nuclear  family is posited  as  
both  natural  and  fundamental  to  the  psychological  
well-being  of  children.  It will be demonstrated below 
that  this  assumption  is  false,  an  affront  to  the  mul-
titude  of  children  who  are  currently  being  reared  in 
loving  and  stable  lesbian  families.  
To  elaborate,  an  increasing  number  of  children  are  
being  reared  by lesbian couples  as  a  consequence  
of  adoption  or  artificial  insemination.0   Most  im-
portanly,  no  causal  connection  has  been  established  
between  a  mother’s  sexual  orientation  and  adverse  
consequences  for  her  child.  Indeed,  children  reared  
by  lesbian  mothers  are  no  more  likely  to  exhibit  
emotional  or  behavioural  difficulties  than  children  
raised  in  traditional,  heterosexual  homes.  Empiri-
cal  research  consistently  demonstrates  that  such  
children  are  as  educated,  healthy,  responsible  and  
law-abiding  as  their  peers.  
 They  are  no  more  likely  to  exhibit  personal  dis-
tress,  social  impairment  or  restricted  activity,  nor  
do  they  possess  a  greater  propensity  toward  cross-
gender  behaviour  or  sexual  confusion.  Rather,  as   
Saffron  notes,  an  abundance  of  mothering  can  be  
construed  as  advantageous,  children  in  two  mother  
families were found  to  be  less  aggressive  and  hos-
tile;  more  aware  of  their  feelings  and  more  em-
pathic  toward  minority  group  members.  
Far  from  placing  children  at  risk,  evidence  suggests  
that  such  familial  forms  are  particularly  conducive  
to  psychological  well-being.  As  Stacey explains,  that  
is,  the  average  lesbian  couple  is  apt  to  be  far  more 
prepared  and  devoted  than  their  average  hetero-
sexual  counterpart.   
There are  no  accidental  same-sex  parents.  Nor  do  
lesbians  have  children  as  a  consequence  of  societal  
or  parental  expectation. In  short,  lesbian  women  
have  children  simply  because  they  want  to,  im-
pelled  by  a  nurturing  instinct  sufficiently  strong  that 
they  are  willing  to  fight  formidable  cultural  barriers  
in  order  to  do  so.  As  Stacey notes:   
On  average,  they  are  better  parents  for  a  whole  
host  of  reasons  that  social scientists  call  selection  
factors.  They  tend  to  be  older  and  better  educated. 
They  obviously  desperately  want  to be  parents.  And  
they  have  overcome numerous  obstructions  in  order  
to  get  to  that  point.
Restricting  marriage  to  heterosexual  couples  does  
not  protect  the  interests  of  children. Instead it  vic-
timizes  them  both  emotionally  and  legally,  denigrat-
ing  the  functional  and  loving  environments  within  
which  they  are  reared. Therefore it holds that mar-
riage  prohibitions  are  both  profoundly  and  tragically  
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“ironic – they  are  anti-family  and  anti-children.  
Dysfunctional Deviants? 
Finally,  many  detractors  oppose  legislative  amend-
ment  on  the  grounds  that  to  do  so  would  constitute  
the  valorisation  of  relationships  that  are  fundamen-
tally  inferior.  In  order  to  understand  the  existence  of  
such  attitudes  it  is  useful  to  briefly  examine  the  so-
cio-political  climate  within  which  portraits  of  lesbian-
ism  are  located.  Indeed,  as  Millbank notes,  we  reside  
in  a  culture  that  accords  structural,  institutional  and  
discursive  privileges  to  heterosexuals,  while  systemati-
cally  denigrating  lesbian  desire,  identity  and  lifestyle.  
Popular  culture  largely  depicts  lesbians  as  overtly  
masculine  and  lacking  in  maternal  sensibility,  their  
choice  of  partner is construed  to  be  the  consequence  
of  rape,  an  irrational  hatred  of  men  and  childhood  
familial  trauma.7   Moreover,  as  Millbank  explains,  
lesbian  relationships  are  assumed  to  be  thoroughly  
unsatisfying  and  discordant,  predicated  on  dominant/
submissive,  sa-
distic/masochistic  
configurations.8   
In  this  all-perva-
sive  climate  of  
devaluation  and  
invisibility  it  is  
unsurprising  that  
same-sex  mar-
riage  is  regarded  
as  detrimental  to  
society’s  inter-
ests.  One  cannot  
be  expected  to  
wholeheartedly  
support  unions  that  they  have  been  conditioned  to  
construe  as  inherently  lacking  in  value.  Nevertheless,  
as  I  shall  discuss  below,  empirical  research  sharply  
refutes  the  aforementioned  presumptions,  suggest-
ing  that  prevailing  stereotypes  are  not  justifiable  and  
that  lesbians  are  equally  capable  of  expressing  and  
sharing  love  in  its  manifold  forms.  As  Justice  Acker-
mann  observes:   
They  are  just  as  capable  as  heterosexual  spouses  of  
forming  intimate,  permanent,  committed,  monoga-
mous,  loyal  and  enduring  relationships; of  furnishing  
emotional  and  spiritual  support…of  constituting  a  
family. They  are  not  a  threat  to  societal  stability.19              
This  tendency  toward  emotional  intimacy  is  noted  by  
Green,  Bettinger  and  Zacks  who  argue  that  lesbian  
relationships  are  characterised  by  a  greater  degree  of 
emotional  bonding,  warmth,  nurturance  and  intense  
physical  and  psychological  intimacy  between  part-
ners.0  After  researching  all  couple  types  (heterosexu-
al,  lesbian,  gay  male)  they  found  that  lesbian  couples 
exhibited  the  highest  rates  of  cohesion. Heterosexual  
married  couples were the  least  emotionally  entwined  
and  the  most  desirous  of  physical  and  psychological  
separateness.  Only  17%  of  lesbians  exhibited  the  low  
levels  of  cohesion  which  typified  over  half  of  the  
heterosexual  sample.  As  lesbian  couple  Pattie  La  
Croix  and Terrah  Keener  explain:  
Our  relationship  is  very  much  a  partnership.  We  
have  a  very  strong  level of  communication  and  a  low  
tolerance  for  being  out  of  sync  with  each other…Be-
ing  in  this  relationship  is  a  very  fundamental  spiritual 
journey.  I think  that  two  women  together  converse  
more  than  other  couples. You  don’t  have  the  gender-
gap  in  same-sex  relationships,  so  you  discuss  your  
feelings  a lot  more.  Advantageously,  you  know  what  
the  other  person is  thinking  and  feeling  because  you  
have  experienced  it…it’s  very fulfilling.22  
In  addition,  assumptions  regarding  the  unhealthy  
preponderance  of  fixed  masculine/feminine  roles  
fail  to  find  support  in  the  research  literature.  
Many  heterosexuals  believe  that  female  couples  
both  pathologically  and  ‘unnaturally’ ascribe  to  rig-
id  dominant-submissive  dynamics  when  interacting,  
one  held  to  enact  the  role  of ‘husband’ and the  
other  of  ‘wife’. Unsurprisingly, empirical  research  
provides  no  justification  for  such  presumptions.  
Put  simply,   most  lesbian  couples  do  not   use  tradi-
tional  gender  role  divisions  to  structure  their  recipro-
cal  behaviours  in  areas  such  as  leadership  and  rules  
regarding  the  household  division  of  labour.  Rather,  
as  Green,  Bettinger  and  Zacks  note,  lesbians  success-
fully  establish  patterns  of  egalitarian  and  highly-flexible  
decision  making,  their  relationship  script  approximating 
that  of  a  friendship  in  which  power  is  equally  held  
and  distributed.   
It   is  clear that  lesbian  partnerships  do  not  pose  a  
threat  to  societal  stability.  Nor  will  their  valorisation  
lead  to  a  plethora  of  social  problems. Instead,  same-
sex  marriage  would  constitute  a  healthy  addition  to  
the  martial  landscape,  providing  a  space  in  which  
many   women  could  grow  to  their  full  intellectual  and  
emotional  potential.  In  this  way,  same-sex  marriage  
would  prevent  societal  decay,  not  contribute  to  it. 
Case Closed
In  conclusion,  as  has been demonstrated,  objections  to  
same-sex  marriage  are    untenable,  based  upon  ho-
mophobic  and  heterosexist  stereotypes  that  bear  no  
resemblance  to  the  realities  of  lesbian   lives. Indeed,  
as  Nicholson notes,  legislative  distinctions  contain  no  
acknowledgment  that  lesbian, gay, bisexual and transves-
tite individuals  possess  and  express  the  most  human  
of  qualities – love  and  commitment  through  relation-
ships.  Lesbian unions are wrongly  framed  as  incapable  
of  furnishing  emotional  and  spiritual  support, as  funda-
mentally  and  uniformly  different; and  as  damaging  to  
minors.  This  is   unacceptable,  a  pyrrhic  achievement  of 
which  no  government  should  be  proud.  In  the  words  
of  Justice  Alastair  Nicholson:      
 
 Marriage  prohibitions  achieve  nothing  but  an  insult  to  
the  dignity  of  recognition  that  every  family  treasures  
and  has  the  right  to  expect  in  a country  that  suppos-
edly  supports  tolerance  for  peaceful  differences among  
its members. They  are  utterly  inhumane.25
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A former Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Honourable Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé is a distin-
guished jurist and considered to be one of the Canadian 
legal profession’s greatest female pioneers. She was the 
first woman appointed to the Québec Superior and Ap-
peal Courts, and the second woman to ever take a seat 
on the Supreme Court of Canada in 1987. She also served 
as the International President of the International Com-
mission of Jurists from 1998 to 2002. Throughout her 
illustrious legal and judicial career, L’Heureux-Dubé has 
been a long-time crusader for women’s rights and social 
justice.
L’Heureux-Dubé’s career is remarkable, particularly at 
a time when women were often not welcome in legal 
circles. When L’Heureux-Dubé decided to attend law 
school in 1949, women in Québec had been allowed to 
practise law for only eight years. L’Heureux-Dubé gave an 
example of when she was denied a scholarship that was 
given to men of the same financial means: “As a female 
law student, I recall that women – we were so very few 
– were not entitled to the same academic opportuni-
ties as men.”  However, as a gifted student, she excelled 
academically and graduated cum laude from Université 
Laval’s law school in 1951 with special awards in Civil Law 
and Labour Law. 
For the next two decades L’Heureux-Dubé worked in 
private practice in Québec City, specialising in family law. 
She was a partner of the firm Bard, L’Heureux & Philip-
pon and later senior partner with L’Heureux, Philippon, 
Garneau, Tourigny, St-Arnaud & Associates. In 1973 she 
was appointed to the Québec Superior Court, and named 
to the Québec Court of Appeal in 1979. Eight years later, 
she became the second woman to be appointed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, after the Honourable Justice 
Bertha Wilson’s appointment in 1982. 
More often than not L’Heureux-Dubé pursued an inde-
pendent course on the Supreme Court. She led the Court 
in the frequency of her dissents and her separate concur-
rences (written agreements with the majority decision). 
Her judicial approach was distinctive, as she drew on 
overseas authorities and academic sources (particularly 
social science research) much more readily than did most 
of her colleagues. L’Heureux-Dubé was prominent in pro-
moting concepts of equality and social justice through 
formulating precedent-breaking judgements in diverse 
areas of the law, including family law, taxation, human 
rights law, immigration law, and criminal law. In 1992, 
she shook the long-held legal definition of judicial notice 
to include a broad range of social studies data in Moge 
v Moge;  while in Canada (Attorney-General) v Mossop  
she took a lone stand in attempting to alter the definition 
of family by acknowledging evolving social norms includ-
ing same-sex partnerships. 
During her fifteen years on the Supreme Court from 1987 
to 2002, L’Heureux-Dubé participated in over 600 Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights decisions, many of which were 
profoundly significant and often controversial. In these 
cases, L’Heureux-Dubé was a strong advocate of access 
to justice and the rights of marginalised groups such as 
women, Aboriginal people, gays and lesbians, people 
Adding Feminism to the Law
Mimi Zou interviews the Honourable Justice 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé
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with disabilities, migrants and prisoners among others. 
For example, in Haig v Canada,  her decision extended 
voting rights to prisoners under the charter. In Moge v 
Moge,5  L’Heureux-Dubé reflected on the harsh economic 
and social realities of a divorce for women and ruled that 
mere economic self-sufficiency did not disqualify some-
one from spousal support in a non-consensual divorce. 
The decision was considered a landmark for women’s 
rights as it addressed the deficiencies of spousal support 
law and developed new statutory interpretation guide-
lines for courts which effectively enhanced protection for 
women with little job experience from becoming desti-
tute after their divorce. As a prominent Canadian family 
lawyer noted after the decision:
[W]omen will take great satisfaction from this judge-
ment. It arms them with real weapons in the battle for 
support. For a very long time obtaining adequate support 
has indeed been a battle for women, and Moge goes a 
long way to redress some of the injustices that have oc-
curred. 
Both on the bench and as a public figure, L’Heureux-
Dubé advanced a feminist analysis of law that served to 
enhance the quality of life for women. She drew criticism 
as well as praise for her written opinions that attacked 
alleged sexism and stereotypical thinking in the deci-
sions of lower courts. In “Adding Feminism to the Law: 
The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé”,7  
the various contributors considered the unique ways in 
which L’Heureux-Dubé’s decisions enhanced women’s 
legal and social equality in Canada, and their influence 
on jurisdictions beyond Canadian borders. Each of the 
contributing essays demonstrated how her judicial ap-
proach was defined by human compassion and an ability 
to see and understand the lived reality of people’s lives. 
The concept of equality for all was at the heart of this 
approach, as she affirmed:
From time immemorial, human beings have thirsted for 
justice. Our pursuit of this ideal has necessarily translated 
into a long and difficult search for truth, impartiality, and, 
ultimately, equality. For, as Alexis de Tocqueville has said, 
equality is the foundation upon which all other rights are 
built. Equality’s intimate link to human rights, justice, 
and impartiality makes it the premier instrument for the 
recognition of rights. 
Since her retirement from the bench in July 2002, 
L’Heureux-Dubé has been serving as a judge in residence 
at Université Laval. We were very fortunate to have 
the opportunity to interview the Honourable Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé who shared with us her thoughts on the 
notion of equality, judicial methods, the ‘rights revolu-
tion’, judicial activism and embarking on a human rights 
career.
The notion of substantive equality often informed your 
judgments. Could you elaborate on what ‘substantive 
equality’ in the law means to you?
 
My vision of the law is that its aim is to promote de-
mocracy and social justice, which is at the heart of true 
democracy. Social justice cannot be achieved without re- 
spect for the dignity of a human being. Equality is about 
human dignity, respect and full participation in society by 
all members of society. Discrimination is the antithesis of 
equality.
A true understanding of equality emphasizes dignity and 
respect for all. It requires substantive change and ac-
commodation rather than simply formalistic egalitarian 
treatment. It is not about ‘being the same’; it is about 
taking account of differences. It is premised on the fact 
that individual dignity may flow as much from one’s own 
value as a human being as from one’s gender or one’s 
membership in a racial, cultural, ethnic or cultural group. 
It is about promoting an equal sense of self-worth. It is 
about treating people with equal concern, equal respect 
and equal consideration. This is the rich contextual un-
derstanding of substantive equality.
You were the first judge in Canada to take judicial notice 
of sociological data - how do you feel that has impacted 
your decision-making?
Judicial notice of sociological data is essential in order to 
apply the law to the reality of people’s lives. It is a tool 
to eliminate myths and stereotypes and to reach a result 
which is grounded in today’s context and people’s real-
ity. Neither the law nor the facts can be interpreted in a 
vacuum: they must be contextualized in order to achieve 
a just result. In law, context is everything.
What does the ‘rights revolution’ mean to you?
 
The ‘rights revolution’, as it is often referred to, dates 
back to the end of World War II with its horrors and 
atrocities. Following Nuremberg, all nations of the world 
got together in the search for a lasting peace and the 
end of the indignities of wars. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948) was such an answer. Signed by 
all nations, it has given the world a common denomina-
tor, which has served as the basis for a number of new 
constitutions. In that sense, the guarantee of fundamen-
tal rights for every human being by the sole fact of their 
birth has brought about a new era in the way the law 
has developed ever since. People have started to think in 
terms of fundamental rights and in response courts have 
developed a body of jurisprudence based on human 
rights and international law, which did not exist to that 
extent previously.
You are often remembered as one of the great dissent-
ers in the Canadian Supreme Court. Your question-
ing of social norms in your legal reasoning have been 
reflected in various landmark judgments such as Moge 
v Moge and Canada (AG) v Mossop. In what ways does 
this questioning of norms enhance the legal and social 
equality of marginalised groups, e.g. women, Aboriginal 
people, gays and lesbians, and people with disabilities 
in Canada?
 
Questioning social norms is part of the search for equal-
ity and justice for all. Professor Graycar in her book ‘The 
Hidden Gender of Law’ has clearly showed how much 
laws were and are still imbued with discriminatory 
assumptions. Unconscious assumptions are often the 
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product of earlier and even current cultural biases. This is 
true for gender as it is for gays and lesbians, aboriginals, 
race, religion and people with disabilities.
 
The rights revolution has been a great factor in uproot-
ing those unfounded assumptions. Being sensitive to 
discrimination in all its aspects does lead to questioning 
social norms and, in so doing, ensuring that laws reflect 
the goal of legal and social equality in a free and demo-
cratic society which is the essential function of the law.
Is there a place for activism in the judiciary?
 
‘Judicial activism’ is a misnomer. It is almost invariably 
used by conservatives- generally when they disagree 
with the result of a decision and decry as ‘activists’ those 
they consider not sufficiently conservative. Judges, in a 
constitutional democracy, have a duty to decide whether 
a legislation does conform with the Constitution. In 
so doing, they may find that it does not and declare a 
particular legislation unconstitutional. For those who still 
insist on parliamentary sovereignty, such a declaration 
would constitute ‘judicial activism’. If that term is to be 
used, it should also apply to strict constructionists whose 
interpretation of the Constitution serves their particular 
agenda. The Constitution is a ‘living tree’ in Lord Sankey’s 
famous words, and interpreting the Constitution as 
promoting democracy recognizes fundamental constitu-
tional values.
What advice would you give to the students at Sydney 
University Law School interested in pursuing a career in 
the field of human rights and social justice?
The field of human rights and social justice is a vast one, 
particularly in this era of a global legal community. It is 
national and international. It is important for law stu-
dents not to lose their ideal of justice and to remember 
that the law is a service to the public. There are today a 
number of NGOs, such as Lawyers without Frontiers, hu-
man rights organizations, legal aid, public legal informa-
tion clinics, etc. which need volunteers here and abroad. 
The ideal for students is to combine their studies with 
time to do pro bono work. It is good for the soul and it 
enhances the profession’s public interest mandate. At 
the end of the day, this is what counts most.
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The Right to Choose
Reena Rihan considers the effect of abortion 
jurisprudence on US politics
Being pro-life or pro-choice is an intensely personal deci-
sion. Trying to change somebody’s mind about abortion is 
an argument that can never be won. There are those who 
are pro-life and illogically accuse those who are pro-choice 
of killing babies. Conversely, many pro-choice proponents 
do not understand how anybody can force their decisions, 
morals and values on another. I am pro-choice because I 
would like to make my own decisions for my own body. By 
the same token, I do not want to be responsible for the 
lives of other women by imposing my values upon them. 
In other words, I am pro-choice because I want to make 
decisions about my body just as much as I want you to 
make decisions about yours. 
Everybody, irrespective of political affiliation, education, 
race, gender or sexuality seems to have an opinion on 
the legality of abortion. Though abortion may not impact 
everyone’s life, we are all potentially affected by abortion 
law. In any debate about abortion law throughout the 
world, the iconic decision of Roe v Wade is invariably men-
tioned as a watershed moment in abortion jurisprudence.
 
Whether you 
believe that the 
decision was a  
wise interpretation 
of an implied right 
to privacy in the 
US Constitution 
or a remarkable 
overstep of judicial 
activism, Roe remains a controversial decision. It is not the 
endurance of the decision but rather the continued tumult 
surrounding abortion policy that keeps Roe in the head-
lines 36 years after it was decided. 
President Obama’s recent nomination of Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor for the position of Associate Justice on the US 
Supreme Court has meant that questions of the composi-
tion of the Court on a Roe issue have been revisited. Until 
a matter with issues similar to those of Roe appears before 
the court, discussion of the positions of the Justices is 
largely speculative. That is not to say that politicians and 
voters should not be concerned with how Justice Soto-
mayor’s views may affect such a decision. 
What is crucial to the consideration of judicial appoint-
ments is finding people who are not closed off to change, 
who are not averse to questioning their own assumptions 
and who are not bound up by partisan propaganda. It is a 
balancing act between being guided by a thorough under-
standing of the law and being able to account for extenu-
ating circumstances. Pre-determined opinions on issues, 
such as abortion, are not the fatal flaw. Rather, the patent 
disregard for the specificities in a certain case in favour of 
a long-held policy is the problem. Such problems manifest 
when politicians select justices based on their stance on 
Roe in the abstract.
In the US, presidential nominees, candidates and judicial 
appointees are continually referred to as being pro- or 
anti-Roe. How can one case, decided three decades ago, 
still be a defining characteristic in contemporary Ameri-
can politics? Maybe, because Roe is seen by many as the 
pinnacle of judicial activism; a point in history where the 
Justices of the Supreme Court determined what was in 
their opinion, the best practical outcome and found a way 
to achieve it within the confines of the law. 
Republicans and Democrats alike are often concerned 
with allowing justices to make up their own minds with-
out being directed by the legislature. Ultimately, what is 
important to remember is that every single jurist earnestly 
believes that his or her interpretation of the law is the 
right interpretation at the time. 
What seems illogical to me is not the reasoning behind 
legal opinions held by potential justices of the Supreme 
Court, but rather the basis for the longstanding fault lines 
between pro-life and pro-choice proponents. For a country 
steeped in the tradition of a separation between church 
and state, there seems to be a lot of discussion about the 
religious immorality of abortion. If religion guides moral-
ity that is an individual prerogative, but it is a choice to be 
guided by religion. The problem for me is when someone 
else’s religion imposes on my decisions and in a country 
that celebrates autonomy, I would like to think I’d be able 
to keep mine.
At the end of the day I would like to be able to keep my 
right to choose what happens to my body. Although you 
may not necessarily agree with my choices, can you justi-
fying denying me this right? Abortions are intensely per-
sonal decisions. But nobody has to live with my decisions 
but me. Abortion policy may be politically contentious 
but should Americans still be voting for politicians who 
appoint judges based on their own opinion of the morality 
of abortion?
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Women of Uttar Pradesh
Brooke Hughes
These portraits were taken in the Mughal gardens of the 
Taj Mahal, on a trip to India last November. The women 
were from a small village in the state of Uttar Pradesh and 
had travelled to visit India’s most famous mausoleum. The 
women were very friendly and keen to chat despite the 
language barriers. 
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“May Samali questions the lack of female representation in the field of International RelationsWhere Are All the Women?International Relations and the  Forgotten SexThe Invisible GenderOn the 19th May 2009, Sally Wilkinson posted a com-ment on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia’s leading indepen-dent international policy think tank. ‘Where are all the women?’ she asked, in reference to the banner on The Interpreter site. The banner features four men, and no women. She continued:“The photo depicts very influential 20th century figures. But it also emanates an unfortunate symbolism. See-ing the photo tapped into my ongoing frustration at the 
fact that the majority of our public policy and political 
discourse is dominated and shaped by men. So I pro-
ceeded to investigate the make-up of the Lowy Institute. 
Only four out of 26 bloggers are women; and one out of 
twelve board members. There is, unfortunately, nothing 
particularly unusual in that.”
Wilkinson’s comment points to the systematic lack of 
female representation in the field of international rela-
tions. The statistics speak for themselves. For example, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
appointed its first female Deputy Secretary as late as 
1996, and by 2008 there was still only one female Deputy 
Secretary out of five. 
On the whole, women international relations scholars 
also lag behind their male colleagues in rank and recog-
nition. This gender imbalance especially applies to those 
areas of international relations at the end of ‘hard’ poli-
tics such as international trade, defence, national secu-
rity and diplomacy. Therefore, in the academic and policy 
world, the credence and weight given to senior female 
views remains limited by the simple virtue of their lack 
of numbers. It is puzzling that women in the developed 
world are not as visible in the international policy world 
as they are in other professions. While women have 
made some serious inroads in law and medicine and in 
the world of business, in the field of international rela-
tions, women are yet to be seen or heard. This is despite 
DFAT’s publication of the book, Women with a Mission: 
Personal Perspectives (2007), which contains stories by 
nine women who headed diplomatic missions and posts 
from 1983 to 2006. These contributions provide valuable 
insights into the demands and rewards, professional and 
personal, of undertaking a career in Australia’s diplomat-
ic service. In one of the stories, Penny Wensley, former 
Ambassador to the United Nations reveals: 
“As a diplomat, I would rather be asked about my expe-
rience representing Australia at the United Nations in 
Geneva, in New York, and as Ambassador for the Envi-
ronment, leading Australian delegations to myriad major 
international meetings, negotiating crucial conventions 
and agreements…But heads of mission who also happen 
to be women are role models; and the judgments made 
about our effectiveness reflect not only on our countries 
but on women in general. There exists an extra dimen-
sion to our experience – at least until there are many 
more of us in places that count.”
Therefore, for the few women who have successfully 
climbed the ranks, gender inequality is still a pressing 
issue. 
Why are Women Underrepresented in International Rela-
tions?
Scholars offer diverse explanations for the underrepre-
sentation of women in international relations. One of 
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the most popular cited reasons in the literature is the 
differential effects of family responsibilities on men and 
women.  Women are more likely than men to interrupt 
their careers to raise children, and they are more likely 
to become primary caregivers for children. However, this 
theory is somewhat limited in accounting for the absence 
of women in top academic and policy positions. 
Some analysts argue that women international relations 
scholars lag behind men in terms of promotion and tenure 
because of differences in productivity. According to this 
argument, women are more likely to hold the ranks of 
assistant and associate professor because they produce 
fewer publications on average than their male counter-
parts. Men out-publish women in political science journals 
by a ratio of two to one. 
Also, women are significantly more likely than their male 
colleagues to collaborate in their research and they are 
disproportionately likely to co-author with men, rather 
than other wom-
en. However, they 
are far less likely 
to be listed as 
the first author 
in these articles. 
Other analysts 
argue that the 
gender gap in pub-
lishing is the result, 
not of differences 
in productivity, but 
of differences in 
ambition, reputa-
tion, and merit. A few even argue that women care more 
about advising, administrative work and departmental 
committees than research.
Another explanation for this gender imbalance is isolation 
or discrimination. On this view, women are more likely to 
be excluded from social networks in departments domi-
nated by men, to receive less institutional support, and to 
suffer from subtle or even overt discrimination. There are 
fewer professional networks for women or opportunities 
for mentoring relationships. One piece of evidence for 
this claim may be the lower percentages of women who 
publish in edited volumes, since professional contacts are 
a key part of participating in these volumes.
The Structural Bias in International Relations 
According to the results of the 2006 Teaching, Research, 
and International Politics (TRIP) Survey, conducted in the 
United States, women scholars’ also focus their research 
around different regions and substantive issues. Compara-
tively higher percentages of women study international 
organization, international political economy, international 
law, the environment and human rights. On the other 
hand, higher percentages of men study US foreign policy, 
international security, international relations theory, and 
comparative foreign policy. Women are also more likely 
to study transnational actors, international organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations than their male 
colleagues. In direct contrast, male international relations 
scholars have a tendency to focus on state actors. These 
findings are consistent with evidence from the broader 
field of political science.In addition to their different sub-
stantive foci, women also adopt different methodological 
and theoretical tools to study international phenomena. 
Women are more likely to employ qualitative methods 
rather than quantitative tools. There is also a greater 
propensity among women to employ non-traditional 
paradigms in their research, such as constructivism and 
post-positivist epistemologies – paradigms that have aris-
en in part as a reaction to the dominance of realism and 
liberalism. Ann Tickner contends that this tendency may 
be explained by the fact that women’s status in society 
helps them to see women’s marginality in scholarship. 
Therefore, women’s underrepresentation in the inter-
national relations field is in part attributed to the way in 
which international policy is conceptualised. Martine Letts 
of the Lowy Institute argues that international security 
voices are still overwhelmingly male because the analytical 
frameworks have changed little since the time of ancient 
political theory. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks 
favoured by women tend to be more focused on conflict 
resolution, development and gender-based approaches.
In reality, there is a structural bias with respect to the way 
women think about security, which does not suit the way 
the world is organised and analysed. There is compara-
tively less “public space” for these kinds of approaches 
in the media, the think-tank and policy world and even 
in academia. This is because security studies still tend to 
focus on the state as the basic unit, with war and peace 
between states and “various muscular and less muscular 
versions of international relations theory all linked to the 
great game being played out between great, emerging and 
waning powers.”
Security scholars focus on notions such as democracy, eco-
nomic security, ideology, ethnicity and national identity as 
factors that impact on security within and between states. 
According to Letts, “by and large that also corresponds to 
the way the world is organised.” Therefore, the traditional 
tools of analysis appear to be a more secure platform from 
which to begin than gender or rights-based approaches 
that many states will not understand and which may ap-
pear “woolly or soft.”
Making the Invisible Visible 
Despite these institutionalised barriers, woman are no less 
interested than men in pursuing careers in international 
relations, whether they be academic or policy-related. For 
example, 34 of the 63 interns at the Lowy Institute have 
been women. A number of them now work at the Depart-
ment of Defence or DFAT, while some have gone on to 
further academic study in international relations. 
Nevertheless, young women see very few models of suc-
cessful women in the field. Role models play an important 
role. Young students, graduates and employees often look 
to more senior members of their fields to understand 
how they got ‘from A to B.’ In Australia, female scholars 
like Coral Bell are the exception that proves the rule, but 
it is not evident who her successors will be. Therefore, for 
50
“A diversity of  
opinions cannot be 
achieved by excluding 
an entire gender from 
the discourse on  
international relations.”
YEMAYA FINAL COPY.indd   52 3/08/2009   8:34:11 AM
“even the most motivated young woman, it is dishearten-
ing to discover that international policy think tanks, uni-
versities and government departments are heavily staffed 
by men, while the majority of secretaries and support staff 
are female.
The women in international relations are hidden in the 
background. They are not featured on any banners, 
and their voices are rarely heard. This needs to change. 
More women, bloggers and scholars alike, must speak 
out against the invisibility of their gender in the world of 
international relations. Women have the power to rede-
sign their own destinies. In her post, Wilkinson claims that 
greater female involvement in international policy will give 
rise to better decision-making and public debate. 
Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute has rejected this 
idea on the grounds that “being a woman is no more of a 
qualification for commenting on international affairs than 
is being a man.” However, if the aim of the Lowy Insti-
tute is to encourage a “diversity of opinion,” as stated by 
Roggeveen, then surely a diversity of opinions cannot be 
achieved by excluding an entire gender from the discourse 
on international relations. While the gender of a scholar 
should not be relevant, it ends up being so because that 
characteristic, rightly or wrongly, has great bearing on the 
person’s education, career, opportunities and experience. 
In order to achieve gender equality, including both in-
tegration of gender perspectives and the recognition of 
women scholars in international relations, the interna-
tional relations discipline needs to become more theo-
retically diverse and pluralistic, including more reflective 
of the global community of scholars. Women scholars, 
many of whom subscribe to non-dominant perspectives 
other than liberalism and realism, can thrive by immersing 
themselves in global networks. They can achieve this by 
linking their careers to the worldwide, multidisciplinary, 
international studies scholarly community, rather than by 
internalizing the narrower, paradigmatic boundaries of the 
domestic international relations field. For example, the 
establishment of the International Journal of Feminist Poli-
tics in 1999 by feminist scholars of international relations 
has built a broad constituency for feminist work across the 
terrain of international studies. 
Both women and men scholars participate in the social 
construction of academic practice in the international 
relations profession. By continuing to engage in innova-
tive international relations research and teaching inspired 
by feminist theoretical perspectives and methodologies, 
scholars can redress the discrimination against women 
in the field. Greater recognition of individual women and 
feminist scholars will only come with greater recognition 
of the importance of intellectual diversity, disagreement, 
and dialogue in the international relations field as a whole, 
and of the collective contribution of feminism, construc-
tivism, post-colonialism and “Other” currently non-domi-
nant perspectives. Ultimately, international relations 
should not be dominated by Y-chromosomes. 
‘Where are all the women?’ Wilkinson asked. Let us tell 
her that the women are on their way. They are coming. 
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“Should Australia adopt a presumption against contact between violent  parents and their children?Emily Gair analyses the legal approach to parental contact where there is a history of family violenceIntroductionPost-separation family violence  is pervasive in Austra-lia. Many women seek to protect themselves and their children from their violent partner by obtaining civil pro-tection orders  to prohibit contact.  These endeavours prove worthless when the prevalence of parenting orders provide legitimate loopholes for contact to continue, compromising the safety of women and children. This essay argues Australia must adopt a rebuttable presump-tion against contact where it is shown a person has used family violence against their partner, child or both.   “Mum...I heard you getting raped”5 - the impact of wit-
nessing  family violence 
Witnessing family violence is a form of child abuse, 
which detrimentally effects a child’s emotional, cogni-
tive and behavioural development.7 ‘Witnessing’8  family 
violence encompasses not only being physically present 
and observing, but hearing family violence, being held 
hostage, used as a weapon against their mother, being 
forced to watch family violence or being hit or threat-
ened when caught in the crossfire.9 
Children witnessing family violence frequently display 
paradoxical behaviour, often being aggressive, antisocial 
and rebellious whilst concurrently exhibiting fearful, 
withdrawn and inhibited behaviour, when compared to 
children from non-violent homes.0 This demonstrates 
the damaging affect witnessing violence has on children’s 
behavioural and emotional functioning.  Children can 
exhibit signs of ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’  and 
commonly revert back to age inappropriate behaviour 
such as bed wetting. Increased anxiety,  depression, 
eating disorders and disruptive sleeping patterns  are 
behaviours commonly associated with exposure to family 
violence.  
Witnessing family violence is often a precursor for a 
child’s own violent behaviour.7  This accentuates the 
impact on the cognitive functioning and attitude, with 
exposure to family violence used to justify their own vio-
lent behaviour.8 Research on incarcerated male juveniles 
from violent homes demonstrated violence is often asso-
ciated with enhancing one’s self image.9 This shows chil-
dren normalising violence, perhaps as a coping strategy, 
in which they reframe and minimise family violence.0     
Long term effects of depression, low self esteem and 
acute anxiety are common in adults exposed to family 
violence growing up.  The normalisation of family vio-
lence often leads children who witness family violence to 
use, or for girls be the target of, violence in adult rela-
tionships.  
The destructive impact of witnessing family violence 
and the overwhelming evidence indicating the intergen-
erational cyclical pattern of family violence  provide 
a strong foundation on which to build a presumption 
against contact between a child and their violent father.  
Post-separation family violence habitually occurs around 
the time of child contact or ‘handovers’ exposing chil-
dren to further family violence, making them susceptible 
to the adverse consequences.  
The more lasting the violence, the more acute the dis-
sonance, the worse the outcome for children who bear 
witness, thus ‘no-contact’ is imperative to minimise 
children’s exposure to violence and the risk of the chil-
dren themselves becoming targets.  Between 30-60% 
of cases where partner or child abuse occurs, one will 
find the other form of violence also being perpetrated.   
Exposure to violence “is not only an unintended conse-
quence of violence between adults, but ..[sic]... is a po-
tential indicator of the occurrence of child abuse.” This 
fortifies the need for ‘no-contact’ as a means of protect-
ing mothers and children from family violence.
 “Our policies are crazy”27 -  pro-contact versus child 
safety
At face value the Part VII of the Family Law Act 97 
(Cth)8  is child centred, emphasising children’s rights in 
relation to shared parenting post-separation and ensur-
ing their protection from family violence.9 The Family 
Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth)0  made the issue of violence 
prominent in the FLA, requiring the court to consider 
a history of family violence and whether there was an 
unacceptable risk of family violence occurring in the 
future, as relevant factors when making decisions about 
children. The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) elevated issues of family 
violence by making it a primary consideration to protect 
the child from physical and psychological harm from 
being subject to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family 
violence.  
The shared parenting philosophy fails to acknowledge 
male perpetrated family violence is a principal factor in 
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the breakdown of heterosexual relationships and that 
family violence does not necessarily end with the end of 
the relationship. This results in ‘pro-contact’ trumping 
family violence considerations with violent fathers be-
ing encouraged to maintain contact with their children, 
providing for potential danger to the child and their 
mother.
The informal presumption of contact is rebutted where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe there has been 
family violence or child abuse7 and unsupervised contact 
with the parent would “expose the child to an unaccept-
able risk of harm.”8 In practice, courts rarely deny con-
tact, despite severe allegations of family violence.9 The 
court’s focus is on how to maintain contact until the final 
hearing rather than whether contact should be ordered 
at all.0 
Rather than suspend parental contact the judicial com-
promise is to order supervised contact, demonstrating 
how the new ideologies of shared parenting expressed as 
children’s rights are synonymous with father’s rights. 
Supervised contact, neutral handovers and contact 
support centres are offered as protective mechanisms 
to ensure the child’s safety either at the interim or final 
hearing concerning family violence allegations, seem-
ingly ignoring the link between family violence and 
child abuse. This illustrates the primacy of the father’s 
perceived right to contact over the child’s right of protec-
tion.  
The rationale appears to be “it would be too horrible 
to contemplate”  denying a father contact if family 
violence allegations were later proven untrue.  Instead 
courts take the gamble of exposing a child to risks of 
physical and psychological harm by ordering supervised 
contact take place. The gamble rarely pays off. A signifi-
cant proportion of cases where contact was ordered at 
interim stages, are later rescinded at the final hearing 
because allegations of family violence have been thor-
oughly evaluated. The danger is, expensive litigation re-
sults in many interim contact orders remaining in place, 
severely jeopardising the safety of the mother and child.  
Issues of family violence are not thoroughly considered 
during the interim hearing, with orders often made 
amongst factual uncertainty.  An interim ‘no-contact’ 
order where family violence is alleged will appropriately 
prioritise safety over the child-parent relationship.7 
Only where allegations of family violence are severe and 
supported forensically, will it become tactically permissi-
ble for a target of family violence to make an application 
for ‘no-contact.’8 Thus the pro-contact climate results in 
inappropriate contact orders between a child and their 
violent father, determined judicially, agreed by consent 
or privately negotiated by the parties.  The inaccessibil-
ity of legal services can lead targets of family violence to 
agree to contact, rather than take on challenges of prov-
ing family violence unrepresented.9 
Where responsibility for making parenting arrangements 
is left to the parties, one must question how freely con-
sent is given.0 
Targets of family violence may find it difficult to negoti-
ate for their own interests because violence creates a 
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substantial power imbalance between the parties. 
Therefore the target may feel under pressure to agree 
to contact arrangements which are unsafe for them and 
their children.  Targets of family violence may have low 
self-esteem due to continual denigration so they may not 
believe they are entitled to much and “may be willing 
to sign anything to get rid of the bastard.” Some women 
consent to contact arrangements because “it’s easier to 
give in...give him what he wants...so then he’ll stop [the 
violence].” Consent should not be equated with satis-
faction with the arrangement, nearly 50% of women  
considered the outcomes reached would compromise 
their own safety or that of their children.7  
Where contact arrangements are court adjudicated, 
issues of family violence are seemingly invisible with 
courts imposing the same ‘standard contact orders’ in 
these situations, as are implemented in cases where 
family violence is not present.8 Despite FLA provisions9  
aimed at overcoming inconsistencies between ADVOs 
and parenting orders, institutional0  ignorance of the 
provisions renders them ineffective. Yet again family 
violence takes a back seat to parental contact.
“The child still needs to have some knowledge about 
their father, even if they come to the conclusion he is 
not a particularly nice person”62 -  justifying contact 
between a child and their violent father 
The ‘pro-contact’ underpinnings of the Act highlight the 
dominant ideology of parenting in Australian society, 
namely ‘two heterosexual parents are better than one.’ 
This rhetoric is spurred on by fathers’ rights groups 
who contend a father has a right to contact, “however 
unworthy he is, he is best and should be involved as 
much as possible...otherwise children will grow up un-
able to form stable relationships.” Claims children who 
are involved with their fathers are less likely to be in 
trouble with the police, gain higher educational attain-
ment, experience less distress and lead a happier life  
aim to authenticate the ‘pro-contact’ culture. However 
it is essential to note these assertions are based on an 
assumption the father is non-violent.  
The psychological theory of identity formation coupled 
with the central role parents play in a child’s recog-
nition of their own identity sees parental contact 
quash considerations of violence.  The absence of a 
violent father is regarded as more problematic for a 
child’s long term development than his presence.7   
Severance of contact may lead to ‘genealogical bewil-
derment,’8  a child’s lack of knowledge of their origins 
which leads to confusion and insecurity about identity. 
This ideology is substantiated in a number of judicial 
decisions, which, despite the fact the children had 
been traumatised as a result of exposure to severe 
family violence, contact with their violent father was 
still ordered as he was believed to be “psychologically 
relevant.”9   
Acknowledging the dire effects contact may have on 
the children it was held “it is ultimately better for 
these children to know [their father] for what he is 
and what he has done than to have him completely 
absent from their lives.”70 The judicial scales erroneous-
ly weigh heavily on anecdotes from disgruntled men7 
as to the impacts of their absence rather than heeding 
to research documenting the adverse effects of expo-
sure to family violence.
“It’s not public enough...”72  – failing to make contact 
safe for targets of family violence
Contact Centres
Supervised child-violent father contact is sometimes fa-
cilitated by specialised contact centres, which aim to pro-
vide a safe environment for children, free from exposure 
to family violence.7 Studies of contact centres7 reported 
generally negative experiences of those who use them. 
Despite strict arrival and departure times, separate 
entrances and security, a number of women reported ex-
periencing family violence whilst using the centres. This 
ranged from being punched, hit, slapped, and grabbed by 
the throat. Psychological violence was also prevalent dur-
ing contact visits which included stalking, death threats, 
threats of sexual violence and vulgar disparagement.7 
The failure of contact centres to adequately provide 
protection for targets of family violence has led appeals 
for centres to be abolished on the grounds contact with 
a violent father unnecessarily compromises the safety of 
women and children.7 
‘Neutral handovers’
The shortage and inaccessibility of many contact cen-
tres means ‘neutral handover’ locations are frequently 
offered as an alternative to centre facilitated contact.77 
The rationale is handovers conducted in a neutral, 
public place will minimise the risk of family violence.  
In practice, women and children are still at grave risk 
from the violent father. Police stations are often desig-
nated handover locations, as they are inherently ‘safe’ 
places.  Regardless of the fact that police stations are 
not “particularly nice [places] for the kids,”78  they fail 
to guarantee the safety of those who use them.79 
The irony is by allocating police stations as handover 
locations decision-makers are conceding the prob-
ability of violence being perpetrated, but “it’s ok 
[because] if anything goes wrong...you’re in the right 
place [to report it].”80   Where family violence has oc-
cured, women are often told to “go outside with your 
domestic”8  highlighting institutional non-feminist 
understandings of family violence.8 Lucy highlights 
the added irony of court ordered handovers at a police 
station where her former partner has prior convictions 
for assaulting a police officer.8 
Child friendly public places such as McDonald’s car 
parks, shopping centres and parks are popular han-
dover points, theoretically reducing the probability of 
family violence being committed.8 
Yet in practice, 40% of mothers who used McDonald’s 
or an equivalent experienced verbal, physical violence, 
or both8  at the hands of violent partners.  
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Third party assistance
Handovers assisted or undertaken by friends or family 
members are largely unsuccessful at eliminating the risk 
of family violence. Third parties report being physically 
and verbally attacked by the violent father,8 making 
them reluctant to help.  Assistance by friends or family 
members may aggravate the violent man and serve as a 
catalyst for increased family violence directed towards 
the target because “[he]...is pissed off he didn’t get to 
see me on my own.”87   
Tactics of social isolation88 employed by violent men 
may mean their targets do not have a familial support 
network to provide a third party willing to assist them. 
These women will be left to implement contact alone, 
making them susceptible to further violence.  
Contact super-
vised by a mem-
ber of the violent 
man’s family is 
problematic with 
concerns about 
the quality of su-
pervision given by 
family members 
who may deny 
or minimise the 
history of fam-
ily violence. The 
inability of a family member to prevent family violence 
during supervised contact is illuminated by the observa-
tion “how is a woman [the violent man’s mother] in her 
late sixties meant to pull him off me?”89 
These vivid accounts illustrate the ineffectiveness of pro-
tectionist mechanisms utilised to alleviate tensions be-
tween the competing s60B objects.  The safety of women 
and children is effectively disregarded as the ‘pro-con-
tact’ principle legitimises continued family violence.
“Daddy said I can punch you...he has shown me how 
to do it”90  – violent men using contact to perpetrate 
indirect violence 
Contact arrangements designed to avoid physical contact 
between the target and the violent man aim to eliminate 
family violence, ensuring the safety of the target and 
removing the probability of children being exposed to 
such violence.  This justification demonstrates a judicial 
propensity to adopt a non-feminist understanding of 
family violence which equates ‘violence’ with ‘physical 
assault.’9 In practice, any form of child-violent father 
provides opportunities for family violence to continue.
Where a violent man is denied access to his target, he 
frequently implicates his children to act as his proxy in 
the continued abuse of their mother.9 Children are re-
cruited to convey “messages to Mummy”9  of a threat-
ening nature, for example, “Daddy has got a gun and is 
going to kill you.”9 Other tactics used to continue family 
violence include attempts to indoctrinate the children 
against their mother,9  interrogation to gain information 
about their mothers,9  denigration and encouraging the 
use of physical violence against their mothers.97    
These experiences demonstrate while the risk of direct-
physical family violence perpetrated by the father against 
the mother decreases, contact continues to provide an 
effectual avenue for psychological abuse.  Many targets 
of family violence deem mental and emotional violence 
as the worst aspect of family violence. Physical injuries 
heal but the fear inflicted by the threat of severe physical 
and sexual violence lives on.98  
Children of violent men are at risk from abuse them-
selves during contact visits.99  These risks include kidnap 
or abduction overseas, hostage taking, physical, sexual 
and psychological violence.00 Contact is sometimes used 
by violent men to maintain ties with their target, rather 
than a desire to spend time with their children.0 Lucy 
explains how her former violent partner often “sees 
red”0  when she does not accompany the children on 
contact visits and on one occasion has “taken his frustra-
tion out on the kids”0  by means of physical violence 
and disparagement.  
Contact visits can adversely affect children.  Children may 
return from contact confused and distressed,0  exhibit-
ing highly aggressive behaviour or ‘acting up.’0 Children 
frequently display problems commonly associated with 
witnessing family violence such as anxiety and refusing 
to eat.0 This behaviour may be symptomatic of the ten-
sion children feel between wanting to spend time with 
their violent fathers whilst concomitantly being extreme-
ly frightened of him.07 
Contact provides a catalyst for family violence, meaning 
the target and children are not given any time to recover 
from the effects of such violence.08 Women may find 
initial contact problematic because they are often still in 
a state of crisis and are in need of time away from their 
violent partner.09 For children, immediate contact with 
their violent father, without time to allow for healing, 
fails to ameliorate the harm caused and for many may 
exacerbate it.0 
For violent fathers, child contact becomes a legitimate 
means of perpetuating patterns of denigration and vio-
lence against their targets,  with children often used as 
tools in their continued campaign of control.  Empiri-
cal evidence supports the notion that contact visits with 
violent men jeopardises the safety of targeted women 
and their children and impair chances of recovery. 
Contact arrangements are made which fail to recognise 
the link between family violence and the welfare of the 
child. 
Not only do children suffer emotionally and psychologi-
cally from having grown up in violent homes but also 
during the process of maintaining contact with their 
violent father which is often fraught with danger.  A 
failure of the current contact provisions to address 
these risks has lead to an acute compromise of safety.  
The only contact arrangement whereby the protection 
of women and their children is paramount is one of 
‘no-contact.’  
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“I’ll drag you into court every day of the week until I get 
what I want”116 – using litigation surrounding contact as a 
form abuse
The FLA reforms provide a new tool for violent men to 
preserve control over their targets7  by effectively giving 
greater scope for harassment by persistently challeng-
ing and undermining the mother’s parental autonomy 
through “an endless cycle of court orders.”8 The judicial 
response is to make highly detailed specific issue orders, 
aimed at reducing grounds for dispute.  However such 
orders are a double-edged sword as they potentially 
allow the violent father to continue family violence9  
by imposing unattainable standards of parenting on the 
mother.0  
Women regard incessant litigation to be driven by a de-
sire to maintain control rather than a desire to see their 
children. Thus it is imperative to ascertain whether 
violent fathers are pursuing contact to fulfil a parental re-
sponsibility or whether they are manipulating the shared 
parenting ideology as a way of reviving family violence. 
Applications alleging contraventions of contact orders 
are additional weapons in a violent man’s legislative 
arsenal. Most applications are brought by the non-resi-
dent parent alleging a failure of the resident parent to 
facilitate parental contact. Most however are without 
merit, which illustrates applications are often pursued 
as a means of harassment rather than being borne out 
of a genuine complaint. Of the legitimate complaints, 
17% were deemed trivial, for example the resident par-
ent being 15 minutes late for a contact visit.
A majority of women report significant and recurring 
contraventions of contact orders with violent father 
being perpetually late or failing to turn up at all.7 Few 
women initiated formal proceedings, citing the expense 
of litigation and fear of reprisal from the perpetrator as 
the breaches are used to “remind [the target] who’s in 
charge.”8 There is a clear double standard in the FLA 
which sees the mother’s contraventions attract penalty 
while a violent father’s failure to maintain contact as 
escape punitive sanctions9 as “you can’t force him to 
be their dad.”0 
The informal 
shared parenting 
presumption pro-
vides violent men 
with a legitimate 
avenue to contin-
ue family violence 
under the guise 
of contact or-
ders.  A pre-
sumption against 
contact where there is a history of violence will deny 
violent men the legislative tools to continue to exert 
power and control over their targets. Litigation sur-
rounding contact arrangements will transpire once the 
violent man has satisfied a court he is rehabilitated to 
the extent he no longer poses a danger to his child or 
their mother.
“If I say I don’t want him seeing the kids ‘cos  I’m worried 
[about their safety] then I’m made out to be a bitch or 
like I’m turning the kids against him”132  – the unfriendly 
parent
The anti-feminist rhetoric of ‘selfish mothers’, driven by 
fathers’ rights groups, proclaim false allegations of fam-
ily violence are used tactically by women to avenge their 
former partners.  S 117AB and s 60CC (3) (c) FLA appear to 
give credence to this narrative, effectively silencing family 
violence. The popular “shibboleth”  is raising allega-
tions of violence “will result in a mother being branded 
unfriendly.”
 Yet in reality the majority of women wish their children to 
maintain contact with their violent fathers, often sacri-
ficing their own safety. Women do not challenge the 
‘pro-contact’ lightly.  Concerns their children are being 
subjected to physical, sexual and psychological abuse are 
cited as reasons for opposing contact.7 Thus, the ‘selfish 
mother’ is in fact the ‘devoted mother’ who endeavours 
to guard her children from their violent father.  
The FLA is suspicious of women opposing contact rather 
than giving appropriate weight to their concerns.  This 
shows the distinct gendered bias which sees a target’s 
concern for safety as sacrilege against the ‘father’s right to 
contact.’8 The responsibility for family violence is shifted 
from the perpetrator to the target who is characterised as 
implacably hostile.
Narratives of the ‘no contact’ mother describes bitter 
ex-wives sabotaging contact are equated with parental 
incompetence.  Clearly demonstrative of gendered bias, 
the irony is such connection between spousal roles and 
parental roles are not made when considering whether 
contact with a violent father would be in the child’s best 
interests.
“I am just trying to teach him how to be man”139  – par-
enting styles of violent fathers
Parenting styles of violent fathers
The number of contact arrangements made between 
violent men and their children indicates the parenting 
capacity of violent men is wildly overestimated.0  
Their potential to be a good father is largely assumed 
with little or no reference to their responsibility of family 
violence.   
Initially the courts were reluctant to make the connection 
between an “abusive husband” and an “unfit father,”  
however judicial acknowledgment of this connection is ap-
parent in an encouraging number of later cases. These 
acknowledgments fail to be reflected in the contact orders 
made. This is symptomatic of a desire for increased paren-
tal involvement exerting a “magnetic pull in these cases 
which impels the courts to avoid considerations of domes-
tic violence.” The inevitable result is “any involvement 
by fathers with their children is good enough fathering.”  
Legislative and judicial assumptions of violent fathers as 
desirable active participants in their child’s upbringing 
must be challenged  in order for the best interests of the 
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child to be met.  Typically, violent fathers engage in a puni-
tive style of parenting, characterised by aggression and 
strict disciplinary rules.7 Violent men frequently feel a 
sense of entitlement in interaction with their children, of-
ten commanding respect and unconditional love, despite 
inflicting terror on the family home.8    
A feminist critique understands family violence as the 
exercise of power and control over their target,9  so it 
is unsurprising strict control is considered an important 
aspect of the father-child relationship for violent men.0   
When obedience and respect is not forthcoming, violent 
men often feel rejected, disrespected and out of con-
trol.  Noncompliance may be regarded by violent men 
as “justified retribution” and may be met by verbal or 
physical violence, or both.    
Exposing children to family violence is tantamount to 
child abuse, thus violent men must be deemed inher-
ently violent fathers.          
Holding violent men accountable for family violence 
Some violent men have a “yearning for a closer, deeper 
connection with their children,”   however lack alterna-
tives to violent behaviour which underpins their parent-
ing skills. Violent men who are sincere in their desire 
for a relationship with their children must participate in 
mandatory counselling and parenting classes specifically 
designed for violent fathers.  Otherwise violent fathers 
are let “off the parenting hook” by making them invis-
ible rather than accountable for their violence.7 
   
Effective intervention with violent fathers, aimed at chal-
lenging deeply entrenched beliefs and fostering a new 
child-focused perspective,8 may rebuild the child-father 
relationship. In some cases previously violent men may 
contribute to a healthier emotional development of their 
children.9 Violent men who have been rehabilitated 
should be encouraged to foster violence free, supportive 
and nurturing relationships with their children.0 
Until the effectiveness of rehabilitation and parenting 
intervention with violent men is demonstrated to the 
degree of satisfying a court that he no longer poses an 
‘unacceptable risk’ to the child,  the safety of women 
and children can only be guaranteed by a prohibition of 
contact. 
Criticism of the ‘no-contact’ presumption
“How do I prove I saw his shadow?”162 - problems with 
collating evidence of family violence
Whilst a rebuttable presumption of ‘no-contact’ prioritises 
the safety of women and children, such presumption is 
only triggered where the evidentiary burden is met. Prov-
ing family violence is notoriously hard due to its inherently 
private nature. It is often committed in secret, away from 
prying eyes of potential witnesses.  Thus being able to 
provide corroborative evidence is uncommon. Judicial 
weight is given to recent accounts of physical violence or 
threats when considering appropriate contact orders. 
Decision-makers are inclined to de-contextualise family 
violence, requesting evidence of ‘incidents’ rather than 
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“understanding family violence as a pattern of power and 
control executed by the perpetrator. Recalling specific 
dates and times of these ‘incidents’ proves difficult as 
targeted women often employ strategies for coping with 
family violence, for example dissociating themselves 
from the violence and minimising its seriousness.   
Physical evidence, for example photographs and hospital 
records needed to prove family violence, is rarely ob-
tained.7 Where family violence constitutes a coercive 
pattern of behaviour over a period of time, obtaining 
substantiated evidence is enormously challenging be-
cause “potential sources of proof may be lost, witnesses 
(if there were any) may no longer be available, injuries 
may have faded and the non-physical symptoms of 
trauma may not be obvious.”8 
The difficulties associated with providing evidence which 
can withstand judicial scrutiny means many targets are 
deterred from raising family violence, often by their 
lawyers.9 Where evidence is provided, it is often of little 
probative value, highlighting the inadequacy with which 
legal practitioners present such evidence.70 These prob-
lems are systemic in family law, with legal practitioners 
failing to pick up on issues of family violence or engage 
in sensitive questioning to explore the possibility.7 A 
mandatory component of family violence to the curricu-
lum of family law is essential so considerations of family 
violence are ingrained on legal practitioners.7   
With the majority of allegations of family violence unsup-
ported by substantive evidence, litigation comes down to 
“his word against mine.”7  The fact allegations of family 
violence are largely met by denial7 and concern targets 
of family violence are unreliable witnesses7  due to 
the psychological harm suffered, adds to the seemingly 
impossible task of proving family violence took place.
The only way to overcome evidentiary hurdles which 
marginalise and silence family violence is to get rid of 
them.  If family violence is to influence post-separation 
contact arrangements a presumption of ‘no-contact’ 
triggered by allegations of family violence is essential.   
Terminating contact where claims have not been forensi-
cally supported seems radical. 
 Yet, given the small percentage of fraudulent claims and 
the high number of interim contact orders which are 
later reversed at final hearing, this step seems the only 
way to guarantee protection to targets of family violence. 
Critics may see that this turns the ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’ philosophy on its head. But it is not the job of the 
Family Court to determine criminal liability; its jurisdic-
tion is to make orders which are in the best interests of 
the child.  Surely eliminating the potential for family vio-
lence by termination of contact should be given greater 
weight than preserving the reputation of a father where 
allegations of family violence prove false?
“My ex-wife once chucked a frozen chook at me”176 
- casting the net too wide?
For Parkinson, a legislative presumption against contact 
where there is a history of violence risks casting the net  
too wide.77 Concern stems from research suggesting in 
some relationships violence is reciprocal which would 
lead to both parents being regarded unfit under such 
presumption.78 Research shows in over 50% of partner-
ships in which violence occurred, both partners struck 
each other with the same frequency.79    
Such research does have its limitations. Research often 
measures isolated acts of violence80  rather than pat-
terns of coercive behaviour which are characteristic of 
family violence.8 Family violence is often confined to 
a non-feminist understanding which equates it with 
physical acts, seemingly ignoring the pervasiveness of 
emotional abuse, social isolation, economic abuse and 
threats and intimidation which are almost always perpe-
trated by men.8 Evidence from police reports, hospital 
and court records demonstrate a clear gender disparity 
in who perpetrates family violence.8  It must also be 
noted that men and women may have different concep-
tions of what constitutes ‘violence’ as vividly illustrated 
by the comment “my ex-wife once chucked a frozen 
chook at me.”8 
Research proclaiming men and women to be equally 
violent must be understood in relation to the severity of 
injuries sustained. Johnston’s study observes women sus-
tain more frequent injuries than men, and such injuries 
are more likely to be serious.8 Statistics do not mea-
sure the motivation for the reported acts of violence8  
and overlook when women use physical violence it “is 
often in the context in which they have been repeat-
edly assaulted by their partner and are trying to defend 
themselves and/or trying to stop his violence.”87 Such 
actions are not family violence88 and should provide an 
automatic rebuttal of the presumption of ‘no-contact.’89   
This would avoid the net being cast too wide.90  
Where family violence is genuinely mutual ideally the 
child ought not to have contact with either violent parent 
until rehabilitation provides them with the skills to be 
better parents.  Although this may seem unrealistic, one 
cannot ignore the research documenting the severe ef-
fects exposure to family violence has on children.  Per-
haps a more realistic approach should follow Louisiana, 
USA, where legislative provisions provide where family 
violence is reciprocal, the ‘no-contact’ presumption fails 
and the court awards residence to the parent who is less 
likely to perpetrate family violence.9 
Conclusion
Despite the prevalence of post-separation family violence 
we have seen the emergence of a ‘pro-contact’ socio-le-
gal climate which unmistakably regards the absence of fa-
thers as a greater social problem than family violence.9 
The FLA not only legitimises but preserves family violence 
by enshrining a violent father’s right to contact9 whilst 
sacrificing the safety of women and children.   
A presumption of ‘no-contact’ may seem a drastic way of 
achieving protection for targets of family violence.  How-
ever, in light of high rates of recidivism and post-separa-
tion violence, ‘no-contact’ is the only certain way to pro-
tect women and children from chronically violent men.9  
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“When you take your beloved dog or cat for their next check up, it seems increasingly likely that they will be cared for by a female veterinarian.  Many clients and 
patients seem to appreciate a woman’s touch. Despite 
this, the veterinary community has not always been 
dominated by women and many aspects of the career do 
not fit the stereotypes of a ‘female profession’.      
Women comprise approximately 75% of the University 
of Sydney Bachelor of Veterinary Science class of 2009. 
This figure reflects the situation nationwide. Recent data 
shows that over 60% of students enrolling in veterinary 
science in Australia are women, and 75% of graduates 
from Australian vet schools are female. Yet not so long 
ago, the veterinary profession was firmly dominated by 
men. It was only as recently as 1935 that the first female 
veterinarian graduated from the University of Sydney, 
and in the 1970s there were still only 100 female vets in 
the whole country. 
The past few decades have witnessed a dramatic shift in 
the make-up of the profession, and female veterinarians 
in Australia have grown to outnumber their male col-
leagues. Similarly in the United States, over 70% of the 
students in the graduating classes 2005 to 2008 were 
women, and in some American veterinary schools, such 
as the Cornell College of Veterinary Medicine, over 80% 
of the graduates are female. 
 
At first glance, the increasing number of women in the 
veterinary profession may seem appropriate given its 
association with ‘feminine’ gestures of compassion and 
baby animals. However, the daily reality of work as a 
vet highlights the shortcomings of generalisations about 
the profession and the concept of ‘women appropriate’ 
careers.
It is difficult to feel glamorous while being drenched in 
excrement, and there is only limited comfort to be had in 
The Gender Shift in Veterinary Science
Steph Hing looks at the rise of women in 
the veterinary science profession
a freshly manicured hand when it is lost several centime-
tres up a cow’s anus. It may surprise many to learn that 
aggravated patients are not the only source of occupa-
tional hazards for vets.
Women in veterinary science face increased risk of spon-
taneous abortion as a result of prolonged exposure to 
radiation, volatile chemicals, hazardous biological materi-
als and anaesthetic gases. Lifestyle is also compromised 
by long work hours limiting time with friends and loved 
ones. The problem of high debt incurred while at uni-
versity is compounded by the average to below average 
salaries following graduation. A 2005 survey of graduates 
from Australian vet schools show that vets were working 
a median of  hours a week and majority of those were 
being paid less than $40,000 per year.  
The difficulties posed by the physical challenges are met 
by similarly strenuous emotional demands. Far from 
caring for ponies, puppies and poodles all day long, vets 
play a crucial role in determining whether or not an 
animal should live or die and how to inform the own-
ers of this decision. This is not a profession for the faint 
hearted.   
So why then has there been such a significant rise in 
female participation in the veterinary profession? 
There are several theories as to why this gender shift has 
occurred. One hypothesis is that the rise of female vets 
has coincided with a growth in small animal practices, 
which may be a particular area of interest for women. 
However, the evidence suggests otherwise, with many 
females in the class of 2009 demonstrating a preference 
for working with cattle and horses in large animal, mixed 
or equine practice. It has also been suggested that more 
young women are meeting the high entry requirements 
than before. Furthermore, where their male counter-
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parts gain the requisite marks, they are more likely to 
choose professions such as law or business given the 
higher levels of remuneration. Although the numbers 
of women in these professions have also been steadily 
increasing, they do not comprise 75% of the graduating 
class as in the veterinary profession.  
The gender shift also has social implications. The Veteri-
nary Student Society has been known to invite students 
from the Engineering faculty to parties to make up the 
testosterone deficiency and a rap from a Vet revue, titled 
‘Where are the Men in Vet?’ to the tune of Men in Black 
has become legendary.  Many students work in private 
practices throughout Sydney, the majority of which are 
run by male vets. The number of men currently occupy-
ing leadership positions in the veterinary profession high-
lights the extent to which the profession was once male-
dominated. However, there are an increasing number of 
clinics which are run by female vets and if the aspirations 
of the class of 2009 are anything to go by, there will be 
many more to come. There are now a number of vet-
erinary workplaces which are female only, occasionally 
joined by a single male figure.
In a 1934 edition of the Australian Veterinary Journal, 
editor Prof. Clunies Ross wrote
“So far there are very few women graduates in veterinary 
science from Australian universities...There is, however, 
every probability that from this year onwards there will 
be a number of women graduates added to the profes-
sion in Australia...There are few today who would deny 
the possibility for women finding useful employment in 
our profession, while there are many who would affirm 
that in the field of research or clinical practice there is no 
conceivable reason why they may not achieve a distinc-
tion equal in all respects to that of their brother mem-
bers.”
Fortunately, we’ve certainly found more than just ‘useful 
employment’ in the profession, and it looks like one day 
we might well be the profession. 
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“A Worthy Challenge - Surrogacy Rights for Homosexual CouplesFelicity Quigley examines surrogacy laws for homosexual couples in AustraliaSurrogate motherhood poses challenges to the concep-tions of motherhood, love and parenting, and raises questions about the use of the female body for such means. The pursuit of parenthood through this avenue by male homosexual couples in particular, further cir-
cumvents traditional ideas of parenthood and the idea of 
the nuclear family. Recent legislative amendments com-
bined with the capacity of females to bear children has 
allowed female homosexual couples to pursue avenues 
of parentage more easily. 
Male homosexual couples however, have not attained 
similar opportunities and their overt difference in 
anatomy and 
minimal gains have 
rendered limited 
avenues available 
to pursue parent-
hood. Consequent-
ly the importance 
of surrogacy as 
a mechanism 
for male homo-
sexual couples to 
have children has 
heightened. To this 
end, this paper will 
first examine male homosexual access to surrogacy and 
assisted reproductive technology in NSW. Second, it will 
aim to provide insight into the legal rights of a child born 
out of a surrogacy arrangement and the means by which 
parties can pursue legal recognition of parentage of the 
child.
SURROGACY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
(ART)
The Commonwealth government is restricted in its abil-
ity “to implement a universal legislative scheme for the 
provision of assisted reproductive technologies.”  Con-
sequently, regulation of this field in Australia is admin-
istered at a state level through a combination of statu-
tory law, ethical guidelines and professional standards.  
Nonetheless, states are bound by Commonwealth legis-
lation governing human cloning and embryo research.  
Such legislation entails compulsory accreditation by the 
Fertility Society of Australia (FSA) for clinics and renders 
the use of human embryos in any way without such ac-
creditation an offence. 
1. Surrogacy
 The National Health and Medical Research Council’s 
(NHMRC) Ethical Guidelines define surrogacy as “the 
arrangement by which one woman (the surrogate 
mother) carries and bears a child for another woman or 
couple(the commissioning mother, or commissioning 
parents) to whom she will transfer custody at or shortly 
after birth.”  A surrogacy agreement however, can take 
several forms. Thus it is imperative to clarify the type of 
surrogacy arrangement that clients propose to under-
take, and the ramifications of such specific characteris-
tics. 
2. Commercial versus Altruistic Surrogacy
The proposition of a monetary payment to a prospective 
surrogate mother would have significant implications. 
This monetary feature would render such an arrange-
ment a commercial surrogacy, which refers to the cir-
cumstance whereby a payment is made to the surrogate 
mother.  This is opposed to a non-commercial or altruis-
tic arrangement, in which “no money is paid to the sur-
rogate mother.”7  Although such agreements are usually 
conducted between friends and family, a stranger can be 
sought to be a surrogate mother in this context.8 
2.1 Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW)
 
As the law stands in NSW, a surrogate arrangement 
whether commercial or altruistic, is neither prohibited 
nor encouraged.9  This is because the Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology (ART) Act 2007 (NSW) has passed both 
Houses in Parliament but is yet to be proclaimed.0  Once 
this legislation comes into force, commercial surrogacy is 
68
“The importance 
of surrogacy as a 
mechanism for male 
homosexual couples 
to have children has 
heightened.”
YEMAYA FINAL COPY.indd   70 3/08/2009   8:34:42 AM
deemed illegal. 
2.2 NHMRC and Reproductive Technology Accreditation 
Council
Due to the inoperative legislation in NSW at present, the 
use of ART for surrogacy is regulated by the NHMRC’s 
Ethical Guidelines  and the Code of Practice for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Units 2008 developed by the 
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Council (RTAC). 
The NHMRC’s guidelines permit the provision of ART 
services for non-commercial surrogacy arrangements, 
but prohibit commercial surrogacy on the grounds that it 
is “ethically unacceptable.”  Non-commercial surrogacy 
agreements, however, will only be facilitated once cer-
tain criteria has been met such as counselling.  Such 
guidelines are only applicable to the extent that they are 
not affected by legislation, or in the absence of legisla-
tion7 and their effect on accredited clinics.
2.3 Accredited Individual Clinics
As Commonwealth legislation governing the use of hu-
man embryos stipulates compulsory accreditation by 
the Fertility Society of Australia (FSA), adherence to the 
NHRMC and RTA guidelines would render clinics unable 
to undertake or facilitate a commercial surrogacy agree-
ment. Sydney IVF is one such clinic, which specifically 
states that ‘surrogacy must involve no payment or com-
mercial element between the commissioning couple and 
the surrogate.’8  Furthermore, once the ART Act 007 
(NSW) comes into force, the actions of third parties such 
as Sydney IVF to facilitate commercial surrogacy agree-
ments will be deemed illegal.9 
2.4 Recommendation - Commercial ambiguity
While there is an array of barriers prohibiting commer-
cial surrogacy arrangements, the ambiguity regarding 
classification of such arrangements0  may be utilised. 
Despite an altruistic surrogacy being labelled ‘unpaid’, 
this arrangement may entail payments throughout the 
surrogates pregnancy, such as medical and counselling 
costs. This lack of clarity encourages clients to consider 
pursuing an altruistic surrogacy agreement. While this 
could not affect the surrogate chosen, it would entail 
replacing a proposed one-off fee with payments through-
out the surrogate’s pregnancy. There are limitations to 
this option, however, which will need to be considered. 
 
3. Advertising for a Surrogate
In NSW there are no laws that prohibit advertising for 
a surrogate mother. Although a couple may advertise 
for a surrogate, it would be advisable not to specify a 
monetary payment on this advertisement. Although 
the advertisement itself is not illegal at present, the 
likelihood that a clinic will engage in a commercial sur-
rogacy arrangement is almost nil. As mentioned, this is 
because any clinic that engages in the use of embryos 
must be accredited and thus will comply with the 
NHMRC’s Ethical Guidelines prohibiting the facilitation 
of a commercial surrogacy agreement. Once the ART 
Act 2007 (NSW) comes into force however, advertising 
with the intent to carry out a commercial surrogacy will 
be illegal. 
4. Artificial Insemination - Full versus Partial Surrogacy
If the surrogate mother was to undergo artificial insemi-
nation from the sperm of one of the couples in a male 
homosexual relationship, this feature would render this 
arrangement a partial surrogacy, also referred to as a 
traditional surrogacy. A partial surrogacy entails the 
provision of the surrogate mother’s oocytes for in vitro 
fertilisation for insemination by the sperm of a donor, 
typically the commissioning parent. This is a partial 
surrogacy since the child is usually related to one of 
the commission-
ing parents.7 The 
other form of sur-
rogacy, full or ges-
tational surrogacy, 
entails in vitro 
fertilisation of a 
woman’s ovum, in 
which the embryo 
is transplanted 
into the uterus 
of the surrogate 
mother8 and 
thus, the commissioning parents may have provided all 
the genetic material for the child.9
 
4.1 Potential Refusal of Clinics to Assist with Partial Sur
rogacy Arrangements
The choice of whether to pursue a partial or full surrogacy 
is with the commissioning parents and is influenced 
by their respective circumstances. It is important to 
consider the rules of specific clinics and whether they 
will facilitate full and/or partial surrogacy arrange-
ments. For example, Sydney IVF “will not assist tradi-
tional (partial) surrogacy arrangements.”0  Given such 
rules, it may be in the clients’ best interests to pursue 
a full surrogacy arrangement. Although it is evident 
that all homosexual couples will not be able to provide 
the entire genetic material for a child, a gay couple 
may use a donor’s oocytes - one method in which this 
obstacle may be overcome. Therefore, the choice of 
undertaking a traditional surrogacy can be hampered 
by specific clinic policies, and this may increase the 
propensity for a surrogate mother to change her mind 
and keep the baby - a situation that presumably all 
clients are keen to avoid. 
5. Eligibility Requirements to Access ART
While the legislation in other Australian state juris-
dictions is primarily concerned with permitting ac-
cess to ART only in circumstances where it is neces-
sary to prevent the transmission of a genetic disease 
or to alleviate clinical infertility, the ART Act 007 
(NSW) is starkly different. In NSW treatments were 
once limited to married or heterosexual de facto 
couples, however this requirement was prohibited 
on the basis that it was inconsistent with Common-
wealth legislation under s 109 of the Constitution.  
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The underlying philosophy of the ART Act 2007 (NSW) 
is to prevent the commercialisation of human repro-
duction and to protect the interests of those involved 
in the provision of ART treatments. Whether such 
aims have actually been fulfilled by this legislation is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
5.1 Potential for Discrimination
As a consequence of the aims mentioned above, 
the ART Act 2007 (NSW) does not stipulate eligibil-
ity criteria for participants to meet in order to gain 
access to ART services. The question of eligibility is 
also not contained within the NHMRC’s guidelines.  
Although this may have been intended to prevent 
discrimination regarding access to treatment in NSW, 
eligibility is left at the discretion of individual clinics. 
Such clinics may adopt a narrow approach, potentially 
limiting treatments to those with a medical need and 
leaving candidates exposed to the discretion of Ethics 
Committees. As Smith notes, such stipulations “may 
actually be justified as “‘reasonable’” on the basis that 
infertility treatments are (essentially) aimed at over-
coming clinical fertility problems and therefore are not 
discriminatory.” NSW may be compelled to legislate 
further however, whether to restrict access to assisted 
reproductive services, or to insert an exemption into 
their anti-discrimination legislation.7 The latter course 
of action will permit variations in eligibility to be 
determined by individual hospitals and clinics. In their 
absence, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) will 
continue to apply.8 
LEGAL RIGHTS TO CHILD
1. The Role of Contracts and Public Policy
The ability to ensure a surrogacy arrangement is fulfilled, 
namely that a surrogate mother gives the child up at or 
shortly after birth, is reliant on the clarity of the contract 
between parties. Although a contract requires many ele-
ments to be valid, such as intention and consideration,9  
it is important to highlight why the unique circumstances 
relevant to a surrogacy arrangement render a contract 
void or illegal.
1.1 Statutory Law
Under statute, a contract may be deemed illegal as 
formed, if the contract is concerned with something ex-
pressly forbidden by statute.0 This principle will apply 
when the ART Act 2007 (NSW) comes into force, which 
deems commercial surrogacy illegal and all surrogacy 
arrangements (including altruistic) not legally enforce-
able.  Furthermore, once commenced s 45 of ART Act 
2007 (NSW) will render all surrogacy agreements void 
“whether made before, on or after the commencement 
of this section,” thus it has retrospective application. 
1.2 Common Law
Contracts can also be void at the common law if they 
are against public policy. This is currently the case 
regarding surrogacy. As Stuhmcke notes:
“Surrogacy throws at law the clash of norms, the as-
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sumption that a child has two parents, that a child 
should be biologically related, that heterosexuals 
should create families, that nature should predetermine 
family formation and that motherhood and fatherhood 
should not be splintered.” 
Commercial surrogacy is particularly controversial, with 
issues ranging from commodification of the child and 
the surrogate mother, to exploitation of poor families 
for the benefit of rich ones. For these reasons con-
tracts cannot be employed to ensure surrogacy arrange-
ments are fulfilled. Thus it is crucial that any surrogacy 
agreement is transparent, with all parties having a clear 
understanding of what the agreement entails from the 
outset, including their rights and responsibilities. Such 
action will enhance the likelihood of the agreement to 
be fulfilled without dispute, a lesson emphasised in Re 
Patrick.7 
2. Recognition of Legal Parentage
 
2.1 Status of Children Act 1986 (NSW)
The Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW) s14(1)8  renders 
the parental responsibility for a child on the birth par-
ents of that child - the woman who gives birth to that 
child and with consent, her husband or de facto hus-
band.9  Additionally, ss 14(2), 14(3) clarifies the issue of 
genetics in regards to the presumptions of parentage. 
Section 14(2) highlights that in the case of sperm donor 
aiding the pregnancy of a female, this donor is “pre-
sumed not to be the father of any child born as a result 
of the pregnancy.” 
In the case of pregnancy by utilisation of an ovum 
obtained from another woman, s 14(3) states that the 
“other woman is presumed not to be the mother of any 
child born as a result of pregnancy.” Hence ss 14(2), 
14(3) emphasise that genetics are not the ultimate 
grounds upon which parentage can be sought, rather it 
is the birth mother and (potentially) her partner. This 
issue is further enforced by s 60H of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth). Thus, the surrogate mother is always con-
sidered the legal parent from birth and is prima facie 
responsible for the care and protection of the child.0 
3. Means to pursue parental rights
The “irrebutable presumption that the commissioning 
parents are not the parents of the child” evidenced 
above stresses the fact that a male homosexual couple 
will not be considered the legal parents, regardless of 
the genetic contribution to the child. All this being 
said, if issues of parental rights arise under surrogacy 
arrangements, they can be resolved through parenting 
orders or adoption following family law proceedings. 
3.1 Parenting Orders
Following amendments to the parentage presumptions 
in the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Mat-
ters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth), the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth) recognises State and Territory parenting 
orders, made under prescribed State and Territory Law, 
transferring parentage of children born under surrogacy 
agreements. This new section of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth), s 60HB dictates that where a child is born 
under a surrogacy agreement, same-sex couples can be 
recognised as the parents of the child if there is a State 
or Territory Court Order in which parentage is transferred 
to them. 
 Although such amendments have had a considerable 
effect on parenting rights for lesbians, male homosexual 
couples have not had a comparative increase in rights. 
Recent amendments to the Births, Deaths and Mar-
riages Registration Regulation 2006 (NSW), the Status 
of Children Act 1996 (NSW) and the Births, Deaths and 
Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW)  have had a 
two-fold effect for lesbian couples. 
Firstly, it has enabled parenting presumptions to be 
made in favour of the birth mother and a consenting co-
mother in a female homosexual relationship, where the 
child was conceived through a fertilisation procedure to 
be born into their relationship.7
Secondly, amendments have enabled the status of 
lesbian couples to be recorded as the child’s parents on 
the child’s birth certificate.8  Thus it is evident that the 
extension of s 60H of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to 
same-sex couples whose child is born out of a surrogacy 
arrangement does not secure parental status for gay 
fathers in the same mechanism that it does for lesbian 
mothers. 
Parentage orders from the Family Court may regularise 
the commissioning parents relationship with the child, 
but will not provide them with full parental rights and 
responsibilities9 and will cease when the child turns 
eighteen years of age.0 Any person concerned with the 
“care, welfare and development of a child” can apply 
to the Family Court for residence, contact or parental 
responsibility.  Although in theory any resident of NSW 
can attempt to apply for parental orders through the 
consent of the Family Court, however there is no guaran-
tee they will be granted as was the case in Re: Evelyn.  
Furthermore, as already noted, Australian courts will 
not enforce a surrogacy agreement as a contract. Hence, 
Family Law tests, rather than contractual principles, will 
apply to any disagreement following the birth of a child 
through surrogacy. As NSW law does not permit two 
fathers to be recognised on a child’s birth certificate,7  
parenting orders are the best means in which to pursue 
parentage at present. 
3.2 Adoption
Adoption is another means through which parenting 
rights can be pursued once the child has been born out 
of a surrogacy arrangement. Unlike parenting orders, 
adoption gives parents full legal rights to a child.8
It is important to note that adoption can usually only be 
instigated with the surrogate mother’s consent and in 
the circumstance that the surrogate mother is related 
to the commissioning parents, there are much more 
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“commercial surrogacy arrangement which faces many 
barriers including prohibition. Clients may wish to pursue 
an altruistic surrogacy by providing a range of payments 
relevant to the surrogacy agreement. The clients may 
also wish to find an ooctye donor that is not the sur-
rogate mother, to enable greater access to clinics that 
prohibit partial surrogacy agreements. An advertisement 
for a surrogacy, should be just that, no mention of pay-
ment nor the intent for a commercial agreement once 
the surrogate is found. 
If individual clinics do discriminate on the grounds that 
the clients are a homosexual couple, they may be in 
breach of the Discrimination Act. As surrogacy agree-
ments are not contained within the realm of contracts, 
there is no way to ensure that the child is given up at 
or shortly after birth. Furthermore, clients will not be 
considered the legal parents of the child, nor can they 
pursue this, as adoption is not at option at present. Thus, 
the clients should pursue parenting orders from the fam-
ily court, but acknowledge that this does not give them 
full legal rights. A potential option briefly mentioned for 
further investigation, is the pursuit of a commercial sur-
rogacy agreement overseas.
This paper has analysed the issue of surrogacy and as-
sisted reproductive technology in NSW, in the context of 
male homosexual couples pursuing this option. The legal 
rights to a child born out of a surrogacy arrangement 
have also been examined, combined with the means in 
which to pursue legal recognition of parentage of the 
child. 
Most importantly however, this paper has highlighted 
the controversy, and ultimately the complexity of a topic 
which raises several issues and questions. These include:
whether the ability of females to bear children equates 
with the right to utilise their bodies for a surrogacy ar-
rangement; and whether the contravention of the ideas 
of parenting, motherhood, fatherhood, love, the nuclear 
family and the like are so perverse as to severely inhibit 
male homosexual couples from being parents. Conse-
quently, such challenges question whether the human 
rights of homosexual couples are being ignored to retain 
the status quo.   
While it is evident that homosexual rights are not on par 
with the rights of heterosexual couples, should we not 
insist that at the very least gay couples should be given 
the same rights as lesbian couples despite their biologi-
cal differences? As the debate rages over surrogacy and 
homosexual parentage, in the absence of substantial 
change, it is important that laws surrounding other 
avenues such as adoption are confronted and hopefully 
changed. Although the pursuit of increasing the rights of 
homosexual couples to pursue parentage may be a chal-
lenge, it is irrefutably a worthy one. 
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concrete mechanisms and rules in which to facilitate 
adoption claims.9 The state courts retain jurisdiction 
over adoption proceedings and before making an adop-
tion order, require a background report from either the 
Department of Family and Community Services or an 
approved private adoption agency.70  
Adoption by same 
sex couples in not 
permitted in NSW 
or internationally.7 
Thus adoption is 
not an option that 
can be pursued by 
the clients at pres-
ent.7 Section 26 of 
the Adoption Act 
2000 (NSW) speci-
fies who can make 
an application for 
an adoption order, 
limiting applica-
tions to an individual or a couple. A couple, however, is 
defined by this Act as a “man and a woman who a) are 
married, or b) have a de facto relationship,” thus exclud-
ing those in a homosexual relationship. Nonetheless, a 
gay couple may apply to adopt as individuals. However, 
this is virtually impossible and fairly token in nature given 
their inherent status as a ‘single carer’, the lengthy wait-
ing lists in Australia and specifications such as explicit 
permission to be given by the birth parents before a child 
can be adopted by a single applicant.7 
3.2 Alternate Means - Overseas Commercial Surrogacy 
Agreement 
 
Commercial surrogacy is legal in some places overseas, 
including the state of California and Canada. However 
it is a very expensive process.7 Nonetheless, Re Mark 
concerned a commercial surrogacy arrangement in the 
United States in 2002 in which a donor egg was used 
and the sperm of Mr X. Mr X and his partner Mr Y, lived 
in Victoria and applied to the Australian Family Court for 
parental responsibility. The Court declared that parental 
responsibility for Mark vests in Mr. X and Mr. Y. Thus, 
“they alone have the duties, powers, responsibilities 
and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to 
children.”7
 
In regards to entry into Australia following surrogate 
birth overseas, “there is no option under migration 
provisions for surrogacy, they are currently considered 
under expatriate provisions which require (amongst 
other things) that the adoptive parent(s) were residing 
overseas for 12 months prior to the adoption for reasons 
other than to adopt a child.”7 If this option is a likely 
path, then further legal advice should be sought. 
4. Recommendation 
Overall, there are certain factors that need to be taken
into consideration by a male homosexual couple wish-
ing to have children via a surrogacy arrangement. As 
acknowledged, a one-off payment is a feature of a 
“Should we not insist 
that at the very least 
gay couples should be 
given the same rights 
as lesbian couples 
despite their 
biological 
differences?”
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Broken 
Sophia Chen explores the pyschological 
complexity of sexual assualt
He wished he knew that some things are better left 
undone. That the thin line which divides reason and the 
dark territory of animal instinct is better left uncrossed. 
Traversing the terrain of black oily desires comes at a 
price too great to pay. And she was part of it. 
She is broken. 
She is fragile as she feeds on the airy substance of hope. 
Whenever she’s not careful or strong, as it is so often 
the case, she gets lost in the labyrinth of memory that 
haunts her unrelentingly. 
Where is not the question. Instead, she would stare at 
Time straight in the face, watching the minutes pour 
themselves into a spiral of hours—when and when and 
when she asks. 
The seconds pulse. 
And then she knows time cannot give her the answer 
which lies elsewhere. Before she finds where that is, she 
would be lost again in the memory that never ends. 
Never will she be free from that horridly small confine-
ment of space in a room where blackness was as thick as 
wool and sticky as lust.  
 Just one touch, please. 
She fretted over the sexual undertone of such a jest in a 
situation like this, hoping that a jest was all that it was, 
despite the discomfort brought by the sudden thickening 
of blackness surrounding a man and a woman in a closed 
small room. 
She was foolish enough to ignore the hoarse and unfa-
miliar personality entwined within that voice.   Oddly 
enough, those dark tales one is exposed to in adoles-
cence didn’t unfold in exactly the same way they were 
told. When the girl reconstructed those tales in her wild-
est fantasies, adding spices of drama seen in fragments 
from fictions, she indulged in the pleasure of recreating 
shock and thrill that were larger than life. 
The fear of falling victim to the frightening blackness had 
evoked a mysterious, bewitching sensation.  But in real 
life, such glorification was non-existent. 
Fear was never as inflated as it was in the dark girlish 
imagination. 
It simply came when humour, the only antidote to the 
intensity aroused by animal instinct, stretched and broke 
against the thick black air.  
Snap. You knew then that you had no control over what 
was going to happen next.  And what was worse? The 
moment of realization of what had occurred. 
The second when the chilling squeeze left by the rough 
hand seeped through the skin of her right breast and 
froze the heart behind. 
The second when those white lips of hers parted to let 
the frozen heart exhale the command get out. 
That second he paused, realized what he had done and 
tried awkwardly to embrace her with apology but found 
he couldn’t move. 
That second was the moment they both knew that the 
action could not be undone.
 The gulf of distrust widened and grew as she fled from 
the dark and grotesque room and walked into the night, 
shivering and cursing his weakness. She doubts the 
scar of this memory is ugly enough to sway justice onto 
her side. Nor is she strong enough to bear the publicity 
which will tear open this wound again and again. 
But would she ever be able to forgive a man who loved 
her unconditionally and in a split second abused such 
love?  
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We know what we are, but 
not what we may be. 
      - Hamlet Act IV. Sc V.“ “
Jayor, Tiruchuli Lucy Boyle
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   Resources for Women
   Assistance and legal resources
    NSW Women’s Refuge Resource Centre               http://www.wrrc.org.au
    Wirringa Baiya                                                                 http://www.wirringabaiya.org.au
    Legal Aid NSW                                                                 http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au
    Women’s Legal Resource Centre                                  http://www.womenslegalnsw.asn.au
    Working Women’s Centre                                              http://www.wwc.org.au/
    Redfern Legal Centre                                                      http://www.rlc.org.au
    Domestic Violence Advocacy Centre                           http://www.dvas.org.au
    Many Rivers Violence Prevention Unit                        http://www.manyrivers.com.au
    Marrickville Legal Centre                                               http://www.mlc.asn.au
   Official bodies, networks 
   and coalitions
    Sydney University Law Society                                      http://www.suls.org.au
    Australian Women Lawyers                                           http://www.womenlawyers.org.au
    Women Lawyers Association of NSW                          http://www.womenlawyersnsw.  org.au
    NSW EEO Practitioners’ Association                             http://www.neeopa.org/
    Women Barristers Forum                                               http://www.nswbar.asn.au
    Equal Employment Opportunity network                   http://www.eeon.com.au
    Australian Virtual Centre for Women and the Law    https://www.nwjc.org.au/avcwl/
    National Women’s Justice Coalition                             http://www.nwjc.org.au/
    National Network of Indigenous 
    Women’s Legal Services                                                  http://www.nniwls.org.au
    Taskforce on Care Costs                                                  http://www.tocc.org.au
    Australian Law Reform Commission                             http://www.alrc.gov.au
   Aid organisations
    UNIFEM Australia                                                            http://www.unifem.org.au
   UTS Anti-Slavery Project                                                 http://www.antislavery.org.au/
    Amnesty International (NSW chapter)                        http://nsw.amnesty.org.au
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